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ABSTRACT
EFFECTS OF UNITED STATES DOMESTIC AGRICULTURAL
GRAIN SUBSIDIES ON MEXICAN MIGRANT FLOWS
by Pat Robert O’Brien
May 2013
United States national, domestic feed grain subsidies have little effect on rural
Mexican migration to the United States. This research shows the effect of the United
States domestic feed grain subsidies on unbalanced trade with Mexico, the effect of
unbalanced feed grain trade on poverty in rural Mexico, and the effect of Mexican rural
poverty on Mexican migration to the United States.
The United States domestic agricultural infrastructure, including the United States
General Services Support Estimate of subsidies, predict increased exports of corn to
Mexico, but producer support subsidies to United States farmers do not.
Mexican estimates of poverty are based on the Instituto Nacional de Estadistica y
Geografia (ENIGH) data and do not support an adverse economic impact on rural Mexico
as a result of this trade imbalance with the United States. During the period studied the
rates of rural Mexican poverty decreased.
Although Mexican migration to the United States has consistently increased, the
rate is not shown to be predicted by lower economic conditions of the Mexican rural
poor. Thus the potential causality of United States national, domestic feed grain
subsidies on rural Mexican migration to the United States is not supported by the data.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
This research investigates the impact of national, domestic feed grain producer
subsidies in the United States on rural Mexican emigration flows, including those into the
United States, and summarizes the subsequent coping strategies of individuals, formal
non-governmental and governmental sectors. It answers the questions what, if any, and
how strong are the stimulus effects of imported subsidized feed grains on the emigration
of the Mexican rural poor.
This research first establishes the extent to which United States domestic
agricultural subsidies result in an unbalanced trade advantage of feed grain exports with
Mexico under the rules of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). There
has been concern about the expected effects of United States domestic agricultural
subsidy policy on rural Mexico, even prior to the scheduled January 2008 elimination of
the remaining agricultural tariffs on corn and other products (Burstein 2007). Second, this
research documents the extent of the economic impact on rural Mexico and the resulting
displacement of agricultural workers from farms as a result of this trade imbalance.
Lastly, this research evaluates migration trends in Mexico, especially those of the
agricultural population from 1990 to 2010. The discussion applies Kuznets’s (1955,
1971) theory of phases of development and migration theory to explain migration from
rural communities to Mexican semi-urban areas, larger urban population centers, and
locations of opportunity in the United States. This research also documents variables that
explain why, though there is significant emigration, the Mexican rural population as
percent of the nation, 24%, is not expected to decrease significantly through 2030

1

(Fussell 2004). The survival mechanisms of the rural Mexican culture are discussed,
including changes in sources of income and increasing dissemination of information that
provides awareness of limited domestic opportunities and motivation to the rural
Mexican population to emigrate.
This paper shows the effect of the United States domestic feed grain subsidies on
unbalanced trade, the effect of unbalanced trade on poverty in rural Mexico, and the
effect of rural poverty on Mexican emigration. Distinctions between legal and illegal
immigration are beyond the scope of this study. This study is to provide policy insight to
factors which affect United States immigration that may otherwise have been overlooked
in public policy development.
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CHAPTER II
THE EFFECT OF U.S. DOMESTIC FARM SUBSIDIES ON
UNBALANCED FEED GRAIN TRADE WITH MEXICO
Introduction
From the early nineteenth century the populations of Central and South America
have been engaged in a struggle against the more organized and intentional trade
complex of the European continent and its children (Bulmer-Thomas 2003). The
organizational infrastructure of industrialized countries is so ubiquitous it overwhelms
competition in lesser developed countries, often ignorantly, as different sectors struggle
in competitive environments.
Review of the Literature
Theoretical Background
Bhagwati (1990) provides insights into national motivations of competition in
international trade by discussing a reciprocity that applies to all other nations and a
reciprocity that applies to only a few. The first he identifies as non-discriminating
multilateralism and the second as discriminating multilateralism, found in preferential
trade agreements. He is especially concerned about the implementation of the “aggressive
unilateralism” of strong economies against weaker competitors. Bhagwati (1994, 231)
subsequently revisits whether free trade is a desirable objective of national policy. He
notes that in addition to the factor market imperfections discussed by Smith, Mill, and
Ricardo, product market imperfections are being emphasized in recent trade theory
discussions. Developed countries fear that developing countries will use free trade to
drive down the wages of unskilled labor, and developing countries fear a loss of level
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playing fields with free trade. Trefler (2004) places these issues in a temporal
perspective, showing the conflict over implementation of free trade between displaced
workers and stakeholders of closed plants who bear short-run adjustment costs and
stakeholders of competitive plants and users of final and intermediate goods who reap
long-run efficiency gains.
Despite established theory of the welfare improving value of free trade, it is not
universally accepted. Bhagwati (1994) observes the development of successive General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) round negotiations, which allows less
developed nations restrictions of free trade, especially in factor markets that attest to the
practice and belief in restricted trade. As developing countries implement protectionist
practices developed countries implement non-tariff barriers (NTBs) in an attempt to
balance the trade restrictions allowed in GATT for developing nations. Developing
countries have a growing fear that as global trade increases unfair advantages will result
in a permanent displacement of local skills. These fears challenge the theory of
comparative advantage and result in vacillation of national outlook toward free trade, as
seen in changes in public opinion about NAFTA in both the United States and Mexico
during its tenure. Although the Factor Price Equalization and Stolper-Samuelson
theorems (Stopler and Samuelson 1941) show the adverse impact of free trade on
individual nations, Leontief (1953) demonstrates in his paradox that sometimes those
factors that seem most scarce or overvalued compose a significant portion of a nation’s
exports. Bhagwati (1994, 242) argues that free trade can overcome the scarce production
factors argument of Stopler-Samuelson by increasing the individual and public wealth of
trading nations, describing the effect as a “lifting-all-boats” of economies. This occurs as
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competition and discipline increase the overall efficiency of industries in countries
involved in free trade.
Bhagwati, Greenaway, and Panagariya (1998) also compare regional trade groups
to world-wide free trade under the World Trade Organization (WTO). These perspectives
are important for Mexico, which implemented trade concessions to the United States and
Canada in an attempt to gain market access, beginning with the Mexican National
Development Plan implemented by President Carlos Salinas de Gortari in 1989. These
same markets were subsequently open to significant competition from Asia and
especially from the People’s Republic of China in 2001, under very similar terms. Viner
(1950) distinguishes between trade diversion and extension. Expected trade diversions of
United States imports from Mexico under NAFTA were mitigated when China became a
member of the WTO. The United States, however, remains Mexico’s largest trading
partner, and although Mexico does not possess labor cost advantages over the People’s
Republic of China, it does have a seven year head start in a trade treaty with the United
States as a result of structural links dating from the mid-1960s in the Maquiladora and
automobile manufacturing industries, and complementary borders providing appreciably
lower transportation costs to Mexican exporters to the United States. Bhagwati notes that
in addition to these advantages, “actual trade diversion . . . reflect[s] the underlying
fundamentals [of] elasticities of substitution among products” (Bhagwati et al. 1998,
1132) and so enhances trade within NAFTA. There are costs of trade within a free trade
agreement. Bhagwati describes the difficulty of implementing a fair trade agreement
tariff policy with multiple component parts and levels of production among many
countries and regions as a “spaghetti bowl” (Bhagwati et al. 1998, 1138), with multiple
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trade authorities implementing different domains within international trade agreements.
Sawyer (2001) notes that there are significant compliance costs of obtaining duty free
benefits of NAFTA and that some potential participants in this free trade regime may opt
out as results of those costs. Krishna (1998) concludes that participation in preferential
trading arrangements in NAFTA is driven by lobbying of concentrated interest groups
and diverts trade from a multinational context to one among trading partners.
Krueger (1999) compares national protectionist policies, in the context of
preferential trading arrangements (PTAs), to multilateral trade arrangements. The
Uruguay Round allows PTAs under certain restrictions. Both Krueger (1999) and
Nguyen, Perroni, and Wigle (1993) agree that the Uruguay Round does not
comprehensively address tariff and non-tariff trade barriers on agriculture. As noted
earlier, PTAs are often borne out of political pressures, and while the formation of the
Canada-United States Free Agreement (CUSFTA) occurred without fanfare, the political
rhetoric “attracted by Mexican accession was entirely disproportionate to the economic
magnitude of the event” (Krueger 1999, 108). Trade between Mexico and the United
States grew significantly following the implementation of NAFTA. Krueger (1999, 113)
notes that within the context of PTAs, “Little has been done analytically or empirically to
evaluate the efficiency costs of having different areas of an FTA confronted by different
prices of intermediate products.” Krueger also notes the importance of the proximity of
trading partners. A situation of comparative advantage of the United States and Canada
with Mexico does exist and can be exploited to increase the welfare of all NAFTA
members. The free tariff environment within NAFTA does have a magnetic effect on
footloose industries which may choose to relocate in Mexico from non-NAFTA
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locations. Krueger (1999) discusses national protectionist’s motivations for adopting a
PTA such as keeping non-member countries out, but does not address how a principal
member of a PTA, such as the United States can abuse that agreement against a weaker
economic power, such as Mexico. Krueger, more tolerant of allowing PTAs than
Bhagwati, expresses concern that most of the research on the effects of NAFTA has been
done within the context of a computable general equilibrium. Though Kruger sees some
aspects in which PTAs are “stepping-stones” to freer trade (Kruger 1999, 122), Bhagwati
sees them as “stumbling blocks” to international free trade (Kruger 1999, 122).
Krugman and Venables (1995) contend that within international trade
arrangements transportation costs affect the real income of the nations involved. They
demonstrate that as transportation costs fall below a critical value, a core-periphery of
developing nations interacting with a central more economically developed nation
spontaneously forms. When this occurs, developing peripheral nations suffer a decline in
real income. They also note that if these transportation costs continue to decrease there is
eventually a convergence of real incomes among the nations involved.
Hufbauer and Schott (2008) describe the trade regime under NAFTA as
successful, tripling trade between the three nations to $900 billion. There are some losers.
Jobs were lost, wages were depressed in some sectors, and emigration from Mexico was
not adequately addressed. They cite that causes of failure subsequent to NAFTA involved
Mexican governmental failure to deliver tax and energy reforms, failure to fund
education infrastructure in Mexico, and failure of the National Mexican government to
eradicate corruption. They encourage a commitment by the Mexican National
government to provide training and opportunity for displaced Mexican labor. The United
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States Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service, NAFTA at 13:
Implementation Nears Completion (2007) notes that the longest tariff transition period of
NAFTA, fourteen years, was extended to corn as a major component of the rural
agricultural sector economy to allow time for labor and industry adjustment to changes
brought about by NAFTA.
Concern from Mexico
The conference and Working Group on U.S.-Mexico Agricultural Issues,
documented by Burstein (2007), convened by the Woodrow Wilson Center and
Fundacion IDEA in April 2007, provides preliminary discussion into the expected effects
of United States domestic agricultural subsidy policy on rural Mexico with the scheduled
January 2008 elimination of the remaining agricultural tariffs on corn, beans, sugar, and
other products. The World Bank’s World Development Report 2008: Agriculture for
Development (2007) examines agriculture as a tool for development and provides a guide
to unanswered issues of this subsidy-induced trade imbalance, including the negative
economic impact on rural Mexico and the displacement of agricultural workers from
farms.
Napoles (2007) observes that the evidence of Mexico’s welfare following the
implementation of free trade regimes is mixed. Carlsen (2008) notes that many in Mexico
fear that the implementation of the Security and Prosperity Partnership (SPP) and Plan
Mexico, virtual extensions of NAFTA, were motivated by and resulted in political
control, not the economic welfare of Mexican citizens.
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Activities in and Explanation from the United States
The profit motive for organizations in a perfectly competitive market, such as
agriculture, is limited to cost reduction of production efforts. The United States
Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service, Feed Grains Backgrounder
(2007) documents government support programs that provide sources of funding that
reduce cost outlay and enhance productive facilities. Safety net programs, income
support, and crop and revenue insurance have provided direct support to feed grain
operators. Other programs of environmental stewardship and demand enhancement
policies, such as those that incentivize ethanol production, provide indirect support.
These policies have impacted feed grain production through acreage reduction programs
(ARP), the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP), and planting provisions under
successive farm legislation. The United States Department of Agriculture, Economic
Research Service, Feed Grains Backgrounder (2007) notes that the United States
domestic corn production is increasing and other feed grains are diminishing as subsidies
and incentives for corn continue to increase. Government payments account for as much
as 8 percent of average gross cash income for feed grain farms. The United States
Department of Agriculture (USDA), Agricultural Resource Management Survey (ARMS)
data for 2003 show that 70 percent of feed grain farms cover cash expenses from gross
cash income. Without government payments, 8 percent fewer feed grain farms would
cover their cash costs. The United States Department of Agriculture, Economic Research
Service, Feed Grains Backgrounder (2007) notes that in addition to government
subsidies, a complete supporting feed grain infrastructure has developed with formal
markets and organizations such as the USDA’s Grain Inspection, Packers and Stockyards
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Administration (GIPSA), which provides standards for product evaluation and more
efficient capital markets.
In addition to sector survival subsidies, trade-related programs for feed grain
producers lower costs and increase profitability of feed grains exported. The United
States Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service and the United States
Department of Agriculture, Foreign Agricultural Service list United States government
trade-related programs, which include export Credit Guarantee programs, help finance
commercial exports of United States agricultural products, and the Market Access
Program (MAP), which develops, maintains, and expands United States agricultural
exports. The USDA, FAS also documents food aid in the form of direct donations and
concessional programs. These programs provide direct United States government
purchases, which result in increasing product demand and, subsequently, prices. They
include the Food for Peace, Food for Progress Act, and the McGovern-Dole International
Food for Education and Child Nutrition Program, paying for United States commodities
donated to developing countries and emerging democracies.
There are some international trade conflicts with United States subsidies. The
United States Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service, Feed Grains
Backgrounder (2007) notes that while the United States government supports its
domestic feed grain sector, the World Trade Organization (WTO) is concerned with
market access, domestic support issues, and renewable energy policy. Blonigen (2006)
contends that the United States dumping margins rose significantly from 1980 to 2000,
attributing much of this increase to the discretionary practices of the United States
Department of Commerce. Knox (2006) notes that of the four dispute resolution
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mechanisms outlined in the NAFTA, the most active is NAFTA Chapter 19 Antidumping
(AD) and countervailing duties (CVD). Schnepf (2010) documents the 2002 Farm Act
challenged during the United States WTO cotton case and that the WTO panel ruled that
United States direct payments for cotton did not meet the definition of decoupled
payments as specified by the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture (URAA), which
deemed that there be no restrictions on the choice of crops grown by the producer.
Bhagwati and Mavroidis (2004) document the reaction of the WTO Appellate Body
against the antidumping provision of the Byrd Amendment, officially known as the
Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000 (CDSOA), because it was not
included in the three forms of duties noted in the WTO Antidumping Agreement.
Bhagwati and Mavroidis also contend that substantively the Byrd Amendment violated
the WTO Antidumping Agreement because, “by over-compensating (allegedly) injured
private parties, the United States turns the tables and disturbs the ‘level playing field,’
this time to the advantage of its nationals” (Bhagwati and Mavroidis 2004, 120) The
United States Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service, Feed Grains
Backgrounder (2007) also notes that the international emphasis on conservation and
environmental programs may allow continued direct payments within the United States;
considered “green box” by the WTO (2007, 39). The Hong Kong Ministerial Agreement
in December 2005 called for reductions in trade-distorting domestic support, elimination
of export subsidies, and increased market access. The United States has agreed to limit
trade-distorting domestic support, and this is expected to affect feed grain producer loan
benefits and crop insurance subsidies, but the United States is concerned about equitable
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treatment in market access, domestic support, export subsidies, and technical barriers to
trade.
The United States implements five interconnected national food aid programs
under the direction of the United Stated Department of Agriculture and United States
Agency for International Development, which purchase agriculture products from
producers in the United States. They include the Food for Progress Program, the
McGovern–Dole International Food for Education and Child Nutrition Program, the Food
for Peace Act (formerly referred to as Public Law 480, Titles I, II, and III), Section
416(b), and the Local and Regional Procurement Project (USDA, Foreign Agricultural
Service, Food Aid). These food stocks are obtained through a national agricultural
repository of commodities known as the Bill Emerson Humanitarian Trust, named in
honor of the late Representative Bill Emerson of Missouri who served as ranking member
of the House Select Committee on Hunger (Hanrahan 2003). These purchases from
United States producers represent a significant guarantee/subsidy to these producers.
John Hays describes price supports as “the last bastion of United States and
European protectionism” (2011, ii). He includes food aid as an export subsidy and posits
that “dumping of agricultural products on the markets of less developed countries, at
prices lower than these products can be locally grown, is detrimental to the farmers of
these nations” (Hays 2011, 261). Hays wonders under which conditions it would be better
for these countries if the aid was in cash instead of agricultural products.
Dual Agricultural Systems
Addressing the effects of agricultural grain subsidies requires review of the
respective agricultural systems of the countries considered. The agricultural system of

12

Mexico is defined by its production capabilities, consumption practices, and the
transformational changes resulting from international pressures. The United States and
Mexico have different agricultural systems and these differences influence trade
balances. The United States focuses primarily on feed grain for animal production with
predominately yellow dent corn. Mexico focuses its corn production efforts primarily
toward consumer foods made from white corn (United States Department of Agriculture,
Economic Research Service, U.S.-Mexico Corn Trade during the NAFTA Era: New
Twists to an Old Story 2004). On average, the United States produced 14.5 times the total
annual production tonnage of corn for 2007 through 2010 of Mexico. While the United
States produces 15.4 percent more total annual tonnage than it consumes during this
period, Mexico runs a 38.9 percent average total annual deficit, consuming more than it
produces (United States Department of Agriculture, Foreign Agricultural Service, 2012.
Table 5: World Corn Production, Consumption, and Stocks).
Corn is grown in all of the states of Mexico. Between 1999 and 2010 an average
of 39 percent of the total cultivated area in Mexico was devoted to corn production
(Secretaría de Agricultura, Ganadería, Desarrollo Rural, Pesca y Alimentación, Servicio
de Información y Estadística Agroalimentaria Pesquera (SAGARPA/SIAP Statistics of
Agricultural Production by Crop). 2011 Agricultural Yearbook 2011). Seventy percent of
Mexican corn production, however, is from eight states: Chiapas, Guerrero, Jalisco,
Mexico, Michoacán, Puebla, Sinaloa, and Veracruz (Mejia and Peel 2009a).
The Mexican agricultural system is composed of large commercial, medium
communal (ejidos), small and very small subsistence farms. Farming systems also vary in
farming practice, whether they irrigate or use dry land farming techniques (rain fed).
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Although much of the corn farming in the United States is without irrigation, the corn
producing regions in the United States experience significantly more and consistent
rainfall than most of the farming regions of Mexico, which tend to be semi-arid (Mejia
and Peel 2009b). Klepeis and Vance (2003) note more successful farms in terms of
efficiency and total production are located where irrigation is used. The United States
Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service, U.S.-Mexico Corn Trade during
the NAFTA Era: New Twists to an Old Story (2004) notes only 9 percent of Mexican
farmers have access to irrigation. Between 1999 and 2010 an average of 26.14 percent of
the total cultivated area in Mexico receives irrigation (Secretaría de Agricultura,
Ganadería, Desarrollo Rural, Pesca y Alimentación, Servicio de Información y
Estadística Agroalimentaria Pesquera (SAGARPA/SIAP Statistics of Agricultural
Production by Crop). 2011 Agricultural Yearbook 2011). Larger Mexican farms tend to
rely on technology inputs such as hybrid seed corn, fertilizer, and herbicides (Vilas-Ghiso
and Liverman 2007), while smaller and subsistence farms rely on manure for fertilizer,
original landrace seeds, and manual cultivation to eliminate weeds (Keleman 2010).
Large Mexican farms employing advanced growing techniques with costly inputs reap
higher yields, and smaller farms with limited inputs produce at a much lower cost, but
reap significantly lower yields (Mejia and Peel 2009a). The United States Department of
Agriculture, Economic Research Service, U.S.-Mexico Corn Trade during the NAFTA
Era: New Twists to an Old Story also notes that only 31 percent of Mexican farms use
“improved varieties of corn” (2004, 5). United States farms are increasingly monoculture
growth systems and rely almost exclusively on commercially provided seed and
fertilizers (Hendrickson, James, and Heffernan 2008). Farmers in the United States are
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increasingly leasing land to large farming operation companies, which subsequently
control all phases of production (United States Department of Agriculture, Economic
Research Service. Trends in U.S. Farmland Values and Ownership 2012). Mejia and Peel
(2009a) note that large commercial and medium sized farms in Mexico grow both white
and yellow corn and that yellow corn has higher yields. They also observe that “all
[Mexican] states experience higher profits [using] commercial production [techniques in]
growing both white and yellow corn” (Mejia and Peel 2009a, 17). Successful yellow corn
production requires technology, improved seed varieties, fertilizer, pest agrochemicals,
access to water, and management (Mejia and Peel 2009a). Between 1999 and 2010 an
average of 3.4 percent of the total cultivated area in Mexico was devoted to yellow corn
production, of this 40.4 percent was irrigated (SAGARPA 2011). Larger Mexican farm
operations have access to finances and risk reduction strategies unavailable to smaller
Mexican farms (United States Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service,
U.S.-Mexico Corn Trade during the NAFTA Era: New Twists to an Old Story 2004).
Crop rotation used in the United States to replenish soil nutrients and reduce soil erosion
is somewhat impractical for small farms in Mexico. “Traditional corn producers in
Mexico often do not have the management skills or the equipment necessary to capitalize
on the yield and profit potential of yellow corn” (Mejia and Peel 2009b, 4). Smaller
producers in arid and in high altitudes with harsher and more variable environments,
however, use locally adapted seeds and farming techniques (Mejia and Peel 2009b).
Boland, Dhuyvetter, and Marshall (2002) observe that most Mexican corn is
grown in regions remote from locations in which it is milled and consumed. It is
harvested twice each year, consumed throughout the year, but storage facilities are
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lacking in Mexico. Most United States farmers have access to product storage facilities.
These storage facilities allow United States farmers to sell harvested corn at optimal
prices and provide continuous delivery of product beyond harvest seasons. During
periods of drought Mexican imports of corn increase. Mexico is also experiencing a
growing livestock industry as the changing income elasticity of demand of consumers is
resulting in more demand for meat and relatively less for grain foods. Livestock sector
growth demands yellow corn for beef, poultry production, cereal, and beer since 1993
have been increasing (United States Department of Agriculture, Economic Research
Service, U.S.-Mexico Corn Trade during the NAFTA Era: New Twists to an Old Story
2004).
Mexican corn production is inefficiently organized. Farm gate prices are low and
intermediaries capture large profits (United States Department of Agriculture, Economic
Research Service, U.S.-Mexico Corn Trade during the NAFTA Era: New Twists to an Old
Story 2004). Market failures occur because of lack of technology, market intermediaries,
corruption, low yield, and inefficiency in the marketing system and structural problems
that prevent transition from subsistence to market based agricultural systems (United
States Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service, U.S.-Mexico Corn Trade
during the NAFTA Era: New Twists to an Old Story 2004). Yellow corn production in
Mexico has increased from below 1 percent of total planted area in 2000 to 4.7 percent in
2010 (SAGARPA 2011). Echánove and Steffen (2005) note restrictions ejidatarios
(members of a communally owned farm) face with access to water for their crops. Cohen
(2001, 957) notes “the Mexican government's agrarian policies that favored large-scale
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irrigation projects over family farms (minifundios) producing largely for selfconsumption.”
Mejia and Peel note that yellow corn is a good crop “alternative because of the
higher profit potential” (2009b, 6) but yellow corn requires “adequate water and much of
the yellow corn is grown on the limited amount of irrigated land available in Mexico
(2009b, 7). “Much corn is grown in high altitudes or in other diverse climate conditions
for which there is no locally adapted yellow corn varieties” (2009b, 7). Boyd and
Ibarraran (2008, 374) discuss the “increasing the intensity of extreme weather events.”
Mexican domestic demand outpaces its supply. Consumption practices in Mexico
are rooted in cultural heritage and national identity (Mejia and Peel 2009b) but are
changing partially due to changing income elasticity and partially due to cultural
influences of developed countries (Schmidhuber and Prakash 2005). Boland et al. (2002)
note that uses for white corn include food-grade starch and paper, tortilla chips, and
tortillas. Corn production in Mexico increases over the period studied, but consumer
demand is increasing more rapidly. Mexico is the fourth largest producer and third largest
consumer of corn in the world (USDA, FAS 2012). Mexico is increasingly dependent on
imports. During1986–2007 Mexican corn production increased from 10.0 to 20.5 million
metric tons (MMT) and corn imports increased from 1.7 to 9.8 MMT (USDA, ERS
database 2011).
The United States Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service, U.S.Mexico Corn Trade during the NAFTA Era: New Twists to an Old Story (2004) notes that
the Mexican starch industry consumes yellow corn imported from the United States, and
large flour companies are increasing this role in tortilla production. United States yellow
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corn exports to Mexico are increasingly used in animal feed but are also used to
“manufacture ethanol, high-fructose corn syrup, corn starch and other products” (United
States Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service, U.S.-Mexico Corn Trade
during the NAFTA Era: New Twists to an Old Story 2004, 2). The report also suggests
that yellow and white corns are interchangeable in some of these processes.
Mejia and Peel (2009a) note that white and yellow corn began to be distinguished
in the international trade data beginning in 2005. They also observe that yellow corn
production in Mexico has become increasingly more attractive as domestic and world
demand for yellow corn increase. Lower Mexican efficiency and production of yellow
corn, however, result in Mexican food industries importing lower cost international corn
rather than purchasing this commodity from domestic sources.
Constance (2012) notes that although ethanol production in Mexico is still
negligible, ethanol production may grow within the Mexican agricultural system and
cause even more reliance on foreign sources of corn supply for animal feed and consumer
food. This change may cause significant supply shocks to the food supply, subsequently
raising prices and inordinately affecting the Mexican poor. The United States Department
of Energy data on Mexican biodiesel and ethanol fuel production from 2007 to 2010
ranges from 36,500 to 146,000 barrels per year. This compares with 167 million to 324
million barrels in the United States per year over the same period. Environmental
concerns in Mexico of the impact on environmental quality similar to that experienced in
the dead zone of the northern Gulf of Mexico may direct national goals away from
ethanol production in an effort to reduce nitrogen and phosphorous as recommended for
the United States by Simpson et al. (2007). This dead zone, or area of hypoxia (depletion
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of oxygen required to support marine life), is caused by excessive nutrient pollution
covering from 1,197 to 6,213 square miles of the Gulf of Mexico at the mouth of the
Mississippi River (United States Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration 2012). Babcock and Fabiosa (2011), modeling ethanol
production from 2005 through 2009, demonstrated that although ethanol production
affects United States domestic corn prices, other commodity market prices and supplies
affect the price of corn more significantly.
The impact of the third member of NAFTA, Canada, merits review with respect
to the interaction of its corn industry with that of Mexico. The Canadian Wheat Board
(Canadian Wheat Board 2012) provides a summary of the history and focus of Canadian
government price supports. Canada has nationalized grain market prices since 1934, and
this effects trade with United States and Mexico. Most of the trade tensions, however,
occur between the western provinces of Canada and the north central plains states in the
United States. Although the Canadian Wheat Board (CWB) controlled corn commodity
prices during World War II, only wheat and barley are currently controlled and centrally
priced by the CWB. The CWB does specify corn product quality for the Canadian Grain
Commission under the Canada Grain Regulations – Section 5 and in that sense influences
Canadian corn production. (Canadian Grain Commission 2012).
Canadian production capacity and domestic need for corn mitigate Canadian
influence on corn production and corn imports in Mexico. Despite Canadian government
influences on corn production, Canadian production tonnage from 2007 to 2011 are only
49 percent of Mexican corn production and only 3.4 percent of United States corn
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production, and as such has only marginal impact on NAFTA corn trade. Canadian corn
producers provide 90 percent of domestic consumption (USDA, FAS 2012).
Theoretical Framework
Feed grain trade imbalances under NAFTA between the United States and
Mexico are affected by multiple variables. To determine the strength and likelihood of
effect a regression of these variables is evaluated for each of the years 1986 through
2007. Annual Mexican imports of corn from the United States, measured in 1,000 metric
tons per year, are used as a proxy for unbalanced feed grain trade, the dependent variable.
Each of the seven independent variables is a ratio that reflects reductions in cost or
increases in productivity between the United States and Mexico that are expected to
impact corn imports. The ratio of total corn production in each country reflects national
capacity of available arable land and cost/benefit decisions of land use. Productivity of
land and yield, (which measures efficiency as a ratio of average metric tons of harvested
corn per hectare) United States/Mexico reflects the soil and climate effects. Natural soil
productive capacity affects costs of production that may not be related to other inputs or
market effects of trade.
Technology is measured as the ratio of tons of fertilizer used per hectare of arable
land, and farm machinery equipment, measured as the ratio of tractor count per 100
square kilometers of arable land. These two measures quantify the ratio of United
States/Mexico invested working capital. The United States Department of Agriculture,
Economic Research Service, Feed Grains Backgrounder (2007) contends that technology
provides efficiency in agricultural production.
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National government subsidies of the farm sector can affect and unbalance trade.
Two comprehensive measures of agricultural subsidies are the Producer Support Estimate
(PSE) and the General Services Support Estimate (GSSE) noted by the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). These, with the Consumer Support
Estimate (CSE), comprise a Total [agricultural] Services Support Estimate (TSE) of a
nation. The PSE measures the “annual monetary value of gross transfers . . . to support
agricultural producers, measured at farm gate . . .” (Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development 2003, under “Glossary of Statistical Terms, Producer
Support Estimate (PSE)”). The GSSE contains support of research and development,
agricultural schools, inspections services, infrastructure, marketing and promotion, public
stockholding, and some miscellaneous agricultural payments. The GSSE measures other
“annual monetary value of gross transfers to services provided collectively to agriculture
and arising from policy measures which support agriculture, regardless of their nature,
objectives and impacts on farm production, income, or consumption of farm products”
(Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 2003, under “Glossary of
Statistical Terms, General Services Support Estimate (GSSE)”). PSE and GSSE ratios of
United States/Mexico reflect government financial involvement in agriculture and effects
of international trade markets. The impact of domestic subsidies on agricultural products
is attested by Bhagwati and Mavroidis (2004), Stiglitz and Charlton (2005), and Burstein
(2007).
Methodology
United States agricultural policy with the wide and deep array of domestic grain
subsidies may reduce Mexico’s competitive position with the United States in labor costs
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and other costs of grain production. This research addresses this effect at a composite
level, assessing whether and to what extent this occurs. United States domestic subsidies
and other agricultural production advantages adversely affect the trade balance in feed
grains, especially maize, in Mexico. Hypotheses are:
H1: The relative increase of United States domestic producer support subsidies
compared to Mexico result in negative corn trade balances for Mexico with the United
States, under NAFTA.
H2: The relative increase of United States domestic general services support
subsidies compared to Mexico result in negative corn trade balances for Mexico with the
United States, under NAFTA.
H3: The relative increase of United States domestic consumer support subsidies
compared to Mexico result in negative corn trade balances for Mexico with the United
States, under NAFTA.
H4: The relative increase of United States domestic corn production compared to
Mexico results in negative corn trade balances for Mexico with the United States, under
NAFTA.
H5: The relative increase of United States domestic corn production efficiency
compared to Mexico results in negative corn trade balances for Mexico with the United
States, under NAFTA.
H6: The relative increase of United States agricultural use of fertilizer compared
to Mexico results in negative corn trade balances for Mexico with the United States,
under NAFTA.
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H7: The relative increase of United States agricultural use of farm equipment
compared to Mexico results in negative corn trade balances for Mexico with the United
States, under NAFTA.
The data for Mexican imports of United States corn are from the United Nations
Food and Agriculture Organization for 1986 through 1988, and from the United States
Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service for 1989 through 2007. Feed
grain production data are obtained from the United States Department of Agriculture,
Foreign Agricultural Service. Technology data for fertilizer consumption and machinery
use are from the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization. Producer Support
Estimates (PSE), General Services Support Estimates (GSSE), and Consumer Support
Estimates (CSE) are from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD).
Feed grain trade imbalances under NAFTA between the United States and
Mexico are evaluated using linear multiple regression addressing multiple causal
variables each of the years 1986 through 2007. This is shown as:
Y = B0 + B1x1 + … Bnxtn + Ut
Such that, UFGT = f (P, L, F, T, PS, GS, CS), where UFGT is the dependent variable of
corn imports from the United States into Mexico measured in 1,000 metric tons per year
(Table 1).
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Table 1
Data Sources – Mexican Corn Imports from the United States
________________________________________________________________________
Year

Corn
Imports
(1,000 Metric Tons)
________________________________________________________________________
1986

1,703.58

1987

3,602.90

1988

3,301.83

1989

4,856.05

1990

2,028.08

1991

918.79

1992

520.98

1993

1,479.55

1994

3,001.74

1995

6,477.19

1996

3,161.57

1997

4,126.88

1998

5,453.89

1999

4,804.24

2000

5,944.55

2001

4,517.34

2002

5,288.34

2003
5,682.53
________________________________________________________________________
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Table 1 (continued).
________________________________________________________________________
Year

Corn
Imports
(1,000 Metric Tons)
________________________________________________________________________
2004
5,885.48
2005

6,335.94

2006

8,767.87

2007
9,817.61
________________________________________________________________________
Note: Source: United States Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service.

P reflects national capacity as the ratio of United States to Mexican annual corn
production measured in 1,000 metric tons per year. L reflects efficiency as the
comparative yield ratio of the United States to Mexico measured in average metric tons
per hectare. Both are shown in Table 2.
Table 2
Data Sources – Production
________________________________________________________________________
Year

U. S.
Mexico
U.S./Mexico U.S.
Mexico U.S./Mexico
Production
Production
Production
Yield
Yield
Yield
1,000 Metric 1,000 Metric Ratio
(MT/ha)
(MT/ha)
Ratio
Tons
Tons
________________________________________________________________________
1980

168,648

10,400

16.22

1.28

5.71

4.46

1981

206,223

12,500

16.50

1.53

6.84

4.47

1982

209,181

7,000

29.88

1.17

7.11

6.08

1983 106,031
9,300
11.40
1.43
5.09
3.56
________________________________________________________________________
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Table 2 (continued).
________________________________________________________________________
Year

U. S.
Mexico
U.S./Mexico U.S.
Mexico U.S./Mexico
Production
Production
Production
Yield
Yield
Yield
1,000 Metric 1,000 Metric Ratio
(MT/ha)
(MT/ha)
Ratio
Tons
Tons
________________________________________________________________________
1984

194,881

9,900

19.68

1.57

6.70

4.27

1985

225,447

10,500

21.47

1.69

7.41

4.38

1986

208,944

10,000

20.89

1.67

7.49

4.49

1987

181,143

9,900

18.30

1.65

7.52

4.56

1988

125,194

10,100

12.40

1.68

5.31

3.16

1989

191,320

9,750

19.62

1.68

7.30

4.35

1990

201,534

14,100

14.29

2.14

7.44

3.48

1991

189,868

14,689

12.93

2.10

6.82

3.25

1992

240,719

18,631

12.92

2.47

8.25

3.34

1993

160,986

19,276

8.35

2.49

6.32

2.54

1994

255,295

16,994

15.02

2.12

8.70

4.10

1995

187,970

17,780

10.57

2.29

7.12

3.11

1996

234,518

18,922

12.39

2.30

7.98

3.47

1997

233,864

17,368

13.47

2.41

7.95

3.30

1998

247,882

17,789

13.93

2.26

8.44

3.73

1999

239,549

19,240

12.45

2.66

8.40

3.16

2000

251,854

17,917

14.06

2.51

8.59

3.42

2001

241,377

20,400

11.83

2.62

8.67

3.31

_______________________________________________________________________
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Table 2 (continued).
________________________________________________________________________
Year

U. S.
Mexico
U.S./Mexico U.S.
Mexico U.S./Mexico
Production
Production
Production
Yield
Yield
Yield
1,000 Metric 1,000 Metric Ratio
(MT/ha)
(MT/ha)
Ratio
Tons
Tons
________________________________________________________________________
2002

227,767

19,280

11.81

2.74

8.12

2.96

2003

256,229

21,800

11.75

2.83

8.92

3.15

2004

299,876

22,050

13.60

2.87

10.06

3.51

2005

282,263

19,500

14.48

2.94

9.29

3.16

2006

267,503

22,350

11.97

3.03

9.36

3.09

2007

331,177

23,600

14.03

3.22

9.46

2.94

2008

307,142

24,226

12.68

3.31

9.66

2.92

2009

332,549

20,374

16.32

3.24

10.34

3.19

2010

316,165

21,130

14.96

3.02

9.59

3.18

2011 313,918
20,500
15.31
3.08
9.24
3.00
________________________________________________________________________
Note: Source: United States Department of Agriculture, Foreign Agricultural Service, Production, Supply and Distribution Online
(PSD)

Technology effects are measured by F, the United States/Mexico ratio of
kilograms of fertilizer used per hectare of arable land. Mexico data is found in Table 3,
and United States and the United States/Mexico ratios in Table 4. Technology effects are
also measured by T, the United States/Mexico ratio of tractors per 100 square kilometers
of arable land (Table 5). Each of these tables presents data from the Food and
Agricultural Organization of the United Nations.
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Table 3
Data sources – Technology, Fertilizer Consumption - Mexico
________________________________________________________________________
Year

Total Fertilizer Total Fertilizer Arable land Arable land Fertilizer
Consumption
Consumption
(sq. km)
(Hectare)
kg/ha
(tons)
(kg)
________________________________________________________________________
1980

1,237,913

1,237,913,000

23,000

2,300,000

538.22

1981

1,560,985

1,560,985,000

23,050

2,305,000

677.22

1982

1,671,942

1,671,942,000

23,138

2,313,800

722.60

1983

1,485,800

1,485,800,000

23,138

2,313,800

642.15

1984

1,660,900

1,660,900,000

23,138

2,313,800

717.82

1985

1,764,100

1,764,100,000

23,300

2,330,000

757.12

1986

1,796,600

1,796,600,000

23,500

2,350,000

764.51

1987

1,887,880

1,887,880,000

23,700

2,370,000

796.57

1988

1,757,400

1,757,400,000

23,900

2,390,000

735.31

1989

1,739,900

1,739,900,000

24,100

2,410,000

721.95

1990

1,798,400

1,798,400,000

24,300

2,430,000

740.08

1991

1,619,400

1,619,400,000

24,450

2,445,000

662.33

1992

1,616,000

1,616,000,000

24,600

2,460,000

656.91

1993

1,591,900

1,591,900,000

24,800

2,480,000

641.90

1994

1,647,900

1,647,900,000

24,900

2,490,000

661.81

1995

1,286,000

1,286,000,000

25,100

2,510,000

512.35

1996

1,636,400

1,636,400,000

25,000

2,500,000

654.56

1997
1,644,100
1,644,100,000
25,000
2,500,000
657.64
________________________________________________________________________
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Table 3 (continued).
________________________________________________________________________
Year

Total Fertilizer Total Fertilizer Arable land Arable land Fertilizer
Consumption
Consumption
(sq. km)
(Hectare)
kg/ha
(tons)
(kg)
________________________________________________________________________
1998

1,804,300

1,804,300,000

25,100

2,510,000

718.84

1999

1,776,000

1,776,000,000

25,100

2,510,000

707.57

2000

1,832,000

1,832,000,000

25,100

2,510,000

729.88

2001

1,865,378

1,865,378,000

25,100

2,510,000

743.18

2002

1,512,561

1,512,561,000

25,100

2,510,000

602.61

2003

1,578,326

1,578,326,000

25,100

2,510,000

628.82

2004

1,699,189

1,699,189,000

25,100

2,510,000

676.97

2005

1,841,638

1,841,638,000

25,000

2,500,000

736.66

2006

1,611,570

1,611,570,000

24,500

2,450,000

657.78

2007

1,756,532

1,756,532,000

24,453

2,445,300

718.33

2008

1,203,288

1,203,288,000

25,202

2,520,200

477.46

2009

1,300,321

1,300,321,000

25,133

2,513,300

517.38

Table 4
Data sources – Technology, Fertilizer Consumption – United States and U.S./Mexico
Input Ratio
________________________________________________________________________
Year

Total Fertilizer Total Fertilizer Arable land Arable land Fertilizer
Consumption Consumption (sq. km)
(Hectare)
kg/Ha
(ton)
(kg)

U.S./
Mexico
Input
Ratio
________________________________________________________________________
1980 21,479,946
21,479,946,000
188,755 18,875,500 1137.98
2.11
________________________________________________________________________
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Table 4 (continued).
________________________________________________________________________
Year

Total Fertilizer Total Fertilizer Arable land Arable land Fertilizer
Consumption Consumption (sq. km)
(Hectare)
kg/Ha
(ton)
(kg)

U.S./
Mexico
Input
Ratio
________________________________________________________________________
1981

19,438,990

19,438,990,000

188,755

18,875,500

1029.85

1.52

1982

16,415,911

16,415,911,000

187,765

18,776,500

874.28

1.21

1983

19,767,528

19,767,528,000

187,765

18,776,500

1052.78

1.64

1984

19,688,206

19,688,206,000

187,765

18,776,500

1048.56

1.46

1985

17,830,541

17,830,541,000

187,765

18,776,500

949.62

1.25

1986

17,285,666

17,285,666,000

187,765

18,776,500

920.60

1.20

1987

17,792,358

17,792,358,000

185,742

18,574,200

957.91

1.20

1988

17,733,130

17,733,130,000

185,742

18,574,200

954.72

1.30

1989

18,709,234

18,709,234,000

185,726

18,572,600

1007.36

1.40

1990

18,586,936

18,586,936,000

185,676

18,567,600

1001.04

1.35

1991

18,784,000

18,784,000,000

185,676

18,567,600

1011.65

1.53

1992

18,991,000

18,991,000,000

184,080

18,408,000

1031.67

1.57

1993

20,349,600

20,349,600,000

182,748

18,274,800

1113.53

1.73

1994

19,297,270

19,297,270,000

181,939

18,193,900

1060.65

1.60

1995

20,037,976

20,037,976,000

181,839

18,183,900

1101.96

2.15

1996

20,310,309

20,310,309,000

179,006

17,900,600

1134.62

1.73

1997

20,165,250

20,165,250,000

177,592

17,759,200

1135.48

1.73

1998 19,773,874
19,773,874,000
176,782 17,678,200 1118.55
1.56
________________________________________________________________________
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Table 4 (continued).
________________________________________________________________________
Year

Total Fertilizer Total Fertilizer Arable land Arable land Fertilizer
Consumption Consumption (sq. km)
(Hectare)
kg/Ha
(ton)
(kg)

U.S./
Mexico
Input
Ratio
________________________________________________________________________
1999

19,563,478

19,563,478,000

175,368

17,536,800

1115.57

1.58

2000

18,794,978

18,794,978,000

175,368

17,536,800

1071.75

1.47

2001

19,614,367

19,614,367,000

175,400

17,540,000

1118.26

1.50

2002

19,462,900

19,462,900,000

172,977

17,297,700

1125.17

1.87

2003

20,520,700

20,520,700,000

171,634

17,163,400

1195.61

1.90

2004

20,492,900

20,492,900,000

167,056

16,705,600

1226.71

1.81

2005

19,582,600

19,582,600,000

165,115

16,511,500

1186.00

1.61

2006

20,247,000

20,247,000,000

160,341

16,034,100

1262.75

1.92

2007

19,975,100

19,975,100,000

161,780

16,178,000

1234.71

1.72

2008

17,371,900

17,371,900,000

163,661

16,366,100

1061.46

2.22

2009 17,794,000
17,794,000,000
162,751 16,275,100 1093.33
2.11
________________________________________________________________________
Note: Source: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations.

Table 5
Data sources – Technology, Agricultural Machinery
________________________________________________________________________
Year

United States Tractors
Mexico
Tractors
U.S./
Tractors
per 100
Tractors
per 100
Mexico
km2 of
km2 of
Ratio
Arable Land
Arable Land
________________________________________________________________________
1980 4,726,000
250.3774734
115,057
50.02478261
5.01
________________________________________________________________________
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Table 5 (continued).
________________________________________________________________________
Year

United States Tractors
Mexico
Tractors
U.S./
Tractors
per 100
Tractors
per 100
Mexico
km2 of
km2 of
Ratio
Arable Land
Arable Land
________________________________________________________________________
1981

4,697,000

248.8410903

143,078

62.07288503

4.01

1982

4,669,000

248.6618912

146,083

63.13553462

3.94

1983

4,671,000

248.7684073

152,319

65.83066816

3.78

1984

4,676,000

249.0346976

155,000

66.98936814

3.72

1985

4,670,000

248.7151493

178,571

76.63991416

3.25

1986

4,730,000

251.910633

202,141

86.01744681

2.93

1987

4,789,000

257.8307545

225,712

95.2371308

2.71

1988

4,548,492

244.882256

250,000

104.6025105

2.34

1989

4,487,595

241.6244898

272,900

113.2365145

2.13

1990

4,426,699

238.4098645

300,000

123.4567901

1.93

1991

4,365,802

235.1301191

317,313

129.7803681

1.81

1992

4,304,906

233.8606041

312,408

126.995122

1.84

1993

4,317,974

236.2802329

307,503

123.9931452

1.91

1994

4,331,042

238.0491264

302,597

121.5248996

1.96

1995

4,344,109

238.8986411

297,692

118.6023904

2.01

1996

4,357,177

243.4095505

292,787

117.114800

2.08

1997

4,370,245

246.0834384

287,882

115.152800

2.14

1998 4,414,705
249.7259336
282,977
112.7398406
2.22
________________________________________________________________________
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Table 5 (continued).
________________________________________________________________________
Year

United States Tractors
Mexico
Tractors
U.S./
Tractors
per 100
Tractors
per 100
Mexico
km2 of
km2 of
Ratio
Arable Land
Arable Land
________________________________________________________________________
1999

4,459,165

254.2747251

278,072

110.7856574

2.30

2000

4,503,625

256.8099653

273,166

108.8310757

2.36

2001

4,548,085

259.2978905

268,261

106.8768924

2.43

2002

4,592,545

265.5003266

263,356

104.9227092

2.53

2003

4,551,998

265.2154002

258,451

102.9685259

2.58

2004

4,511,452

270.0562686

253,546

101.0143426

2.67

2005

4,470,905

270.7752173

248,640

99.456000

2.72

2006

4,430,359

276.3085549

243,735

99.48367347

2.78

2007 4,389,812
271.344542
238,830
97.66899767
2.78
________________________________________________________________________
Note: Source: The World Bank – Global Development Finance Database.

PS is the ratio of the Producer Support Estimate subsidies between the United
States and Mexico (Table 6), GS is the ratio of the General Services Support Estimate
subsidies between the United States and Mexico (Table 6), and CS is the ratio of United
States/Mexico Consumer Support subsidies (Table 6).
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Table 6
Data sources – Subsidies
________________________________________________________________________
Year Mexico U.S.
PSE
Mexico U.S.
GSSE Mexico U.S.
CSE
PSE
PSE
Ratio
GSSE GSSE Ratio
CSE
CSE
Ratio
USDmn USDmn
USDmn USDmn
USDmn USDmn
________________________________________________________________________
1986

550

38,019

69.15

999

13,481 13.50

781

(4,167) (5.34)

1987 1,077

39,118

36.32

542

13,387 24.71

346

(6,076) (17.56)

1988

(90)

31,520 (349.10)

499

14,179 28.42

1,602

(1,140) (0.71)

1989

2,574

38,637

15.01

695

15,456 22.25

(850)

(9,635) 11.33

1990

4,303

31,265

7.27

1,270

16,856 13.27

(3,078) (1,044) 0.34

1991

7,528

30,734

4.08

905

20,963 23.15

(5,803) (560)

0.10

1992

8,300

31,585

3.81

1,102

24,199 21.96

(6,101) 1,372

(0.22)

1993

9,484

33,819

3.57

1,308

26,456 20.23

(6,990) 587

(0.08)

1994

7,005

29,059

4.15

1,167

28,047 24.02

(3,310) 2,485

(0.75)

1995 (1,059) 20,423 (19.28)

551

27,216 49.37

2,440

7,383

3.03

1996

1,541

29,161

18.92

541

25,564 47.26

203

2,840

14.00

1997

4,285

30,258

7.06

371

24,253 65.43

(2,460) 3,133

(1.27)

1998

5,191

46,485

8.96

417

22,629 54.26

(3,479) (5,059) 1.45

1999

5,246

55,746

10.63

508

22,520 44.30

(3,911) (4,684) 1.20

2000

7,397

52,278

7.07

628

22,382 35.61

(5,416) (466)

2001

6,484

51,040

7.87

649

24,141 37.19

(4,238) (1,236) 0.29

2002

9,227

40,335

4.37

629

26,944 42.82

(7,088) 3,823

0.09

(0.54)

2003 6,610 36,091
5.46
878
30,696 34.94
(4,023) 9,863
(2.45)
________________________________________________________________________
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Table 6 (continued).
________________________________________________________________________
Year Mexico U.S.
PSE
Mexico U.S.
GSSE Mexico U.S.
CSE
PSE
PSE
Ratio
GSSE
GSSE Ratio
CSE
CSE
Ratio
USDmn USDmn
USDmn USDmn
USDmn USDmn
________________________________________________________________________
2004

4,260

43,254

10.15

823

32,850 39.90

(1,769) 9,100

(5.14)

2005

5,007

40,629

8.11

815

35,830 43.97

(1,776) 14,474

(8.15)

2006

5,572

30,561

5.48

775

38,399 49.55

(1,780) 20,372

(11.44)

2007

6,119

33,203

5.43

982

37,809 38.52

(1,865) 12,172

(6.53)

2008

6,320

27,043

4.28

835

45,088 53.98

(921)

(29.47)

27,129

2009 5,821 30,598
5.26
764
56,651 74.17
(1,760) 28,631 (16.26)
________________________________________________________________________
Note: Source: Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development.

As these ratios (Table 7) increase the research hypothesis is that there is an
increase in a negative trade balance in corn for Mexico.
Table 7
________________________________________________________________________
Data sources – Regression Data
________________________________________________________________________
Year Maize
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
Imports /Mexico /Mexico /Mexico /Mexico /Mexico /Mexico /Mexico
(1,000) Production Efficiency Fertilizer Tractor PSE
GSSE
CSE
Metric Ratio
Ratio
Ratio
Ratio
Ratio Ratio
Ratio
Tons
________________________________________________________________________
1986

1,703.58

20.89

4.49

1.20

2.93

69.15

13.50

-5.34

1987

3,602.90

18.30

4.56

1.20

2.71

36.32

24.71

-17.56

1988 3,301.83
12.40
3.16
1.30
2.34
(349.10) 28.42
-0.71
________________________________________________________________________
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Table 7 (continued).
________________________________________________________________________
Year Maize
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
Imports /Mexico /Mexico /Mexico /Mexico /Mexico /Mexico /Mexico
(1,000) Production Efficiency Fertilizer Tractor PSE
GSSE
CSE
Metric Tons Ratio
Ratio
Ratio
Ratio
Ratio Ratio
Ratio
________________________________________________________________________
1989

4,856.05

19.62

4.35

1.40

2.13

15.01

22.25

11.33

1990

2,028.08

14.29

3.48

1.35

1.93

7.27

13.27

0.34

1991

918.79

12.93

3.25

1.53

1.81

4.08

23.15

0.10

1992

520.98

12.92

3.34

1.57

1.84

3.81

21.96

-0.22

1993

1,479.55

8.35

2.54

1.73

1.91

3.57

20.23

-0.08

1994

3,001.74

15.02

4.10

1.60

1.96

4.15

24.02

-0.75

1995

6,477.19

10.57

3.11

2.15

2.01

(19.28) 49.37

3.03

1996

3,161.57

12.39

3.47

1.73

2.08

18.92

47.26

14.00

1997

4,126.88

13.47

3.30

1.73

2.14

7.06

65.43

-1.27

1998

5,453.89

13.93

3.73

1.56

2.22

8.96

54.26

1.45

1999

4,804.24

12.45

3.16

1.58

2.30

10.63

44.30

1.20

2000

5,944.55

14.06

3.42

1.47

2.36

7.07

35.61

0.09

2001

4,517.34

11.83

3.31

1.50

2.43

7.87

37.19

0.29

2002

5,288.34

11.81

2.96

1.87

2.53

4.37

42.82

-0.54

2003

5,682.53

11.75

3.15

1.90

2.58

5.46

34.94

-2.45

2004

5,885.48

13.60

3.51

1.81

2.67

10.15

39.90

-5.14

2005

6,335.94

14.48

3.16

1.61

2.72

8.11

43.97

-8.15

2006 8,767.87
11.97
3.09
1.92
2.78
5.48
49.55
-11.44
________________________________________________________________________
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Table 7 (continued).
________________________________________________________________________
Year Maize
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
Imports /Mexico /Mexico /Mexico /Mexico /Mexico /Mexico /Mexico
(1,000) Production Efficiency Fertilizer Tractor PSE
GSSE
CSE
Metric Tons Ratio
Ratio
Ratio
Ratio
Ratio Ratio
Ratio
________________________________________________________________________
2007 9,817.61
14.03
2.94
1.72
2.78
5.43 38.52
-6.53
________________________________________________________________________
Findings
The regression model for these variables shows a high level of significance of
.0059 with R-square and adjusted R-square values of .7079 and .5618 respectively (Table
8).
Table 8
Regression Output
________________________________________________________________________
Source

SS

df

MS

Model

84217722.6

7 12031103.2

Residual

34756962.6 14 2482640.18

Number of obs

=

22

F( 7, 14)

=

4.85

Prob > F

=

0.0059

R-squared

=

0.7079

Adj R-squared

=

0.5618

Total
118974685 21 5665461.2
Root MSE
= 1575.6
________________________________________________________________________
Imports
Coef.
Std. Err. t
P> t
[95% Conf. Interval]
________________________________________________________________________
Production

435.1176 364.7258 1.19

0.253

-347.1415

1217.377

Efficiency
-1588.243 1648.545 -0.96 0.352
-5124.022
1947.535
________________________________________________________________________
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Table 8 (continued).
________________________________________________________________________
Imports
Coef.
Std. Err. t
P> t
[95% Conf. Interval]
________________________________________________________________________
Fertilizer

4603.403 2553.782 1.80

0.093

-873.9151

10080.72

Tractors

3059.115 1634.436 1.87

0.082

-446.4015

6564.631

PSE

-3.528154 5.180063 -0.68 0.507

-14.63828

7.581976

GSSE

55.41359 32.79305 1.69

0.113

-14.92051

125.7477

CSE

.7624109 71.50022 0.01

0.992

-152.5903

154.1151

Constant
-12555.83 6493.849 -1.93 0.074
-26483.75
1372.092
________________________________________________________________________
The p-values for the independent variables are significant for two variables and
marginally significant for another; the one-tail p-value for the United States/Mexico ratio
of tractors per 100 square kilometers of arable land is .041 with a coefficient of 3059,
United States/Mexico ratio of fertilizer consumption per hectare of arable land is .0465
with a coefficient of 4603, and the United States/Mexico ratio of General Services
Support Estimate (GSSE) at .0565 and with a coefficient of 55. The null hypotheses for
these three independent variables are rejected.
As the United States/Mexico ratio of tractors per 100 square kilometers of arable
land increases by one, Mexican imports of corn from the United States, as indicated by
the coefficient, increase by 3,059,115 metric tons. The average number of tractors per
100 square kilometers during the period studied is 252 in the United States and 110 in
Mexico. A change in this tractor ratio by one requires an increase of the number of
tractors in Mexico by 77.3 percent or 85 more tractors per 100 square kilometers. This
predicts a reduction of corn imports from the United States by 3,059,155 metric tons per
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year. A decrease of 30 percent or 33 tractors per 100 square kilometers in Mexico will
also result in this magnitude of change, increasing the corn imports by 3,059,155 metric
tons per year. These results indicate that over the 22 years in this study there is strong
predictability between use of agricultural equipment in Mexico and the rate of
importation of corn into Mexico from the United States.
As the United States/Mexico ratio of fertilizer per hectare of arable land increases
by one, as indicated by the coefficient, Mexican imports of corn from the United States
increase by 4,603,403 metric tons or approximately one half of the average imports per
year over the period studied. The average kilograms of fertilizer per hectare of arable
land consumed during the period studied is 1,095 in the United States and 688 in Mexico.
A 168 percent increase or 1,162 more kilograms of fertilizer per hectare in Mexico will
result in this magnitude of change, decreasing Mexican imports of corn from the United
States by 4,603,403 metric tons per year. Likewise, a 38.5 percent decrease in fertilizer
use in Mexico of 265 kilograms per hectare predicts a corresponding increase in Mexican
imports of corn from the United States of 4,603,403 metric tons annually.
As the United States/Mexico ratio of GSSE increase by one, as indicated by the
coefficient, imports of corn increase by 55,140 metric tons. This ratio averages 7.33 per
year throughout the period studied, with United States averaging 36.286 billion USD per
year and Mexico 4.948 billion USD. An increase of United States GSSE expenditure of
4.948 billion USD, or a decrease of Mexican GSSE expenditure of .5937 billion USD
results in an increase of this ratio by one, reflecting an increase of imports of 55,140
metric tons annually. Also, a decrease of United States GSSE expenditure of 4.948 billion
USD or an increase of Mexican GSSE expenditure of .781 billion USD results in a
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decrease of this ratio by one, reflecting a decrease of imports of 55,140 metric tons
annually. Although GSSE has a marginal 1-tail p-value of .0565, corn exports of 55,140
metric tons to Mexico is not a meaningful coefficient.
The rest of the independent variables have p-values with much less significance.
The 1-tail p-values for these variables include .1265 for the production ratio, .176 for the
production efficiency ratio, .2535 for the Producer Support Estimate (PSE) subsidy ratio,
and .496 for the Consumer Support Estimate (CSE) subsidy ratio. These United
States/Mexico ratios do not predict the dependent variable of tonnage of United States
exports of corn to Mexico.
The null hypothesis cannot be rejected for production or efficiency ratios,
Producer Support Estimate (PSE) subsidies, or for Consumer Support Estimate (CSE)
subsidies, but is rejected for the technology input ratios (fertilizer consumption and farm
equipment use) and General Services Support Estimate (GSSE) subsidies. Changes to
ratios of farm equipment use, fertilizer consumption, and General Services Support
Estimate (GSSE) subsidies do predict changes in United States exports of corn to
Mexico.
Analysis
The purpose of this model is to demonstrate the effects of government subsidies,
national production levels, and the application of technology on the quantity of net
imports of corn into Mexico from the United States. The data provides a sample size of
22 observed years. The time-series model satisfies the assumptions of the classical linear
regression model; the data is linear in its parameters, there is no perfect collinearity
among the independent variables, it possesses a zero conditional mean for each year, the
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data is homoscedastic, there is no serial correlation between time periods, and the errors
of the independent variables are normally distributed.
The model’s residual plots, residual-versus-predictor (Figures 1-7) indicate the
independent variables of the model follow a random pattern, indicating a good fit of the
data for linear regression analysis. The data are neither non-random U-shaped, nonrandom inverted U-shaped, nor trending. None of the independent variables are
constants, or a perfect linear combination of others. The model has relatively small
residual with an F statistic of .0059, indicating that for each observation the expected
value of the error is zero. These evidences provide that the estimators are unbiased
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indicators of the model; the ordinary least squares (OLS) of this model are unbiased.

5

10

15

20

Production

0
-1000
-2000
-3000

Residuals

1000

2000

Figure 1. Residuals for the independent variable production.
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Figure 2. Residuals for the independent variable efficiency.
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Figure 3. Residuals for the independent variable fertilizer.
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Figure 5. Residuals for the independent variable Producer Support Estimate Subsidy
(PSE).
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Figure 6. Residuals for the independent variable General Services Support Estimate
Subsidy (GSSE).
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Figure 7. Residuals for the independent variable Consumer Support Estimate Subsidy
(CSE).
The model’s residual plots also demonstrate a variance of the errors and so
demonstrate that the model is homoscedastic. The unobserved variables affecting the
dependent variable have a constant variance over time. The errors in different time
periods are also uncorrelated; there is no serial correlation. Durbin-Watson test of the
model reveals Durbin-Watson Statistic D values, for the independent variables with
significant p-values, between the lower critical value DL and the upper critical value DU
indicating inability to determine autocorrelation of this data set with the Durbin-Watson
test (Table 9).
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Table 9
Durbin-Watson Statistic Values
________________________________________________________________
Model, IV k
n
D
DW table used
DL
DU
________________________________________________________________________
Fertilizer

8

22

1.366926

5%

0.863 1.940

Tractors

8

22

1.366926

5%

0.863 1.940

GSSE
8
22
1.366926
5%
0.863 1.940
________________________________________________________________________
Given that these data satisfy the five assumptions of a time-series model the OLS
estimators (Gauss-Markov theorem) they are the best linear unbiased estimates (BLUE)
of the variables in this model. The errors for each time period are independent of the
causal variables and are distributed in a normal distribution (Wooldridge 2006, 352, 354).
Since this model fits the classic linear regression model assumptions, we can accept that
the causal variables in this model affect the response variable of imported corn from the
United States into Mexico.
Goodness of fit for this model also explains the variance of the coefficient of
determination (R-square) and adjusted R-square, which are .7079 and .5618, respectively.
The adjusted R-square compensates for lost degrees of freedom by reducing the
explained variance of the model for each additional independent variable. Although a
longer time-series is desired, this data set provides the available and most consistent data
set for this study. The independent variables in this model account for over 56 percent of
the variation in the model, and the calculated F statistic for the model of .0059 indicates
that the probability of this influence by the independent variables occurring solely by
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chance is remote. This provides confidence that the model is accounting for significant
changes in corn trade balance between the United States and Mexico.
Three independent variables provide p-values that indicate significant
probabilities. The residual plots for these independent variables (Figures 1-7) reveal
random patterns confirming the randomness and homoscedasticity of the data. The
findings of this model are consistent with other research and established trade theory, as
Bulmer-Thomas (2003) describes the propensity of the organizational infrastructures of
industrialized countries overwhelming competition from lesser developed countries, and
Bhagwati’s describes the implementation of the “aggressive unilateralism” of strong
economies against weaker competitors (Bhagwati 1994, 231).
Ratio of farm equipment in the United States and Mexico using as a proxy the
number of tractors per 100 square kilometers of arable land has a 2-tailed test value of
.082, a 1-tailed .041 p-value to predict negative trade balances of corn in Mexico with the
United States. The coefficient of 3059.115 indicates that with this high degree of
certainty (p-value) a change in unity of the United States/Mexico tractor ratio per 100
square kilometers predicts an increase of this unbalanced corn trade by a factor of onethird of the average tonnage per year over the period studied. The ratio of consumed
fertilizer per hectare of arable land in the United States and Mexico has a 2-tailed test
value of .093 and a 1-tailed 0.0465 p-value to predict negative trade balances of corn in
Mexico with the United States. The coefficient of 4603.403 indicates that with this high
degree of certainty (p-value) a change in unity of the United States/Mexico fertilizer
consumption ratio per hectare of arable land predicts an increase of this unbalanced corn
trade by a factor of one half of the annual corn trade per year over the period studied.
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The ratio of General Services Support Estimate (GSSE) in the United States and
Mexico has a 2-tailed test value of .113, for this measure a 1-tailed 0.056 p-value to
predict negative trade balances of corn by Mexico with the United States. The coefficient
of 55.41359 indicates that with this moderate degree of certainty (p-value) a change in
unity of the United States/Mexico GSSE expenditure results in an increase of this
unbalanced annual corn trade by 55,414 metric tons annually.
The independent variables in this model are ratios of national quantities of the
United States and Mexico. Yield (L) and fertilizer (F) are compared per hectare. This
model demonstrates that as the ratios of the United States/Mexico domestic farm
equipment use, fertilizer consumption, and General Service Support subsidies increase
the Mexican imports of United States corn from 1986 through 2007 increased. The null
hypotheses for these data are rejected. There are strong probabilities with measurable
coefficients that increasing the United States/Mexico ratios of farm equipment use and
fertilizer consumption increase corn imports to Mexico from the United States. The
United States/Mexico GSSE ratio demonstrates in this model, a moderate probability, and
with measured coefficients, that increases in the United States/Mexico GSSE ratio of
domestic expenditure predicts a moderate, but measureable, increase in unbalanced trade
in corn in Mexico with the United States.
What is most surprising from this study is that Producer Support Estimates;
payments to the farmers, and Consumer Support Estimates, government support of
market consumption, are not significant in this model. Others, such as Burstein (2007)
advocate that subsidies paid to United States farmers (producers) directly affect the costs
and prices of the supply chain of corn and its delivery to Mexico. This claim is not borne
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out by this model. The findings of this model are that direct producer subsidies and
consumer market subsidies are not found to affect the corn trade balance of the United
States and Mexico, that PSE and CSE subsidies may not have implications for trade with
Mexico, while GSSE does.
Additionally, it is surprising that neither quantity of production as a ratio between
the United States and Mexico, nor the yield ratio between these two countries possesses
statistical significance with respect to unbalanced trade in corn in this model and, hence,
provides no predictive power of Mexican corn imports from the United States. The null
hypothesis is not rejected. These three measures of agricultural inputs in this model show
no relation to the quantity of Mexican corn imports. The application of this model to
considerations of production, efficiency, PSE, and CSE is that none of these affect the
corn trade balance of the United States and Mexico.
Conclusions
Relative agricultural production, yield ratios, and producer and consumer
government subsidies between the United States and Mexico appear to have no impact on
the amount of Mexican corn imported from the United States. Government subsidies in
the form of General Services Support Estimate (GSSE), however, do predict the size of
United States corn exports to Mexico. Further, the findings of this model indicate that
increases in mechanization in the Mexican farming sector and increases in inputs such as
fertilizer consumption in Mexico significantly predict reduction in unbalanced corn trade
between the United States and Mexico.
Policy implications for the United States government and subsequent legislative
initiatives indicate that producer and consumer domestic subsidies do not have a
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predictive impact on corn trade with Mexico and that increases in general services
support expenditures have only moderate predictive and quantitative impact on this trade.
Contentions that individual domestic farm supports or consumer supports for food affect
international trade with Mexico are not borne out by this study. Furthermore, for both
national governments, these findings show that domestic mechanization and associated
domestic producer efficiency remain the most significant enhancers of production with
subsequent effect on international corn trade.
An economy’s size does matter to national growth. These findings are consistent
with Bhagwati’s (1994, 231) insight and concern about the implementation of
“aggressive multilateralism” of strong economies against weaker competitive nations,
despite the tendency of international trade to increase the individual and public wealth of
trading nations, in an effect described as a “lifting-all-boats” of the economies involved
in that trade (Bhagwati 1994, 242). Bulmer-Thomas’ (2003) hypothesis also predicts that
especially in technical productive capacity the organizational infrastructures of the most
industrialized countries overwhelm lesser developed ones.
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CHAPTER III
THE EFFECT OF MEXICAN CORN IMPORTS AND MEXICAN AGRICULTURAL
SUBSIDIES ON THE ECONOMIC CONDITIONS OF
THE MEXICAN RURAL POOR
Introduction
Unbalanced feed grain trade, especially corn, between the United States and
Mexico, under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) is said to adversely
affect the welfare of rural Mexico (Burstein 2007). Modern economic theory accepts the
welfare enhancing effects of free trade (Stiglitz and Charlton 2005, 12), but free trade
agreements do not always increase everyone’s welfare (Stiglitz and Charlton 2005, 28).
During the first decade of free trade under NAFTA, economic growth in Mexico was
slower than it had been prior to 1980, and the “mean real wages [in Mexico] at the end of
the decade were lower, and some of the poorest had been made worse off as subsidized
American agricultural products flooded the market and lowered the price received for
Mexican domestic production. Inequality and poverty both increased under NAFTA”
(Stiglitz and Charlton 2005, 23). Other poverty-inducing factors exist, the impact of
which are analyzed in this chapter. Although Mexicans benefit from a cheaper
consumption basket, this research investigates the effect of increasing Mexican imports
of corn from the United States and the levels of Mexican agricultural subsidies on the
welfare of the rural Mexican population.
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Review of the Literature
Theoretical Background
Bhagwati, defending economic globalization and free trade, contends that
countries with lower tariffs have higher rates of growth (Bhagwati 2004, 3). He shows
that effects of free trade are welfare-enhancing for the poor (Bhagwati 2004, 60-64).
Less sanguine about the benefits of free trade, Stiglitz notes that there is no
conclusive empirical evidence that trade liberalization leads to national economic growth
(Stiglitz and Charlton 2005, 33). He also notes that different regions approach policies of
integration, openness, and free trade differently (Stiglitz and Charlton 2005, 20). East
Asia, for example, does not follow orthodox free trade prescriptions, but dual policies of
import protection and export promotion (Stiglitz and Charlton 2005, 16). Srinivasan and
Bhagwati (1999) note that free trade can contribute to reduced income and growth when
market failures exist in an economy. A regime of free trade may not effectively
contribute to a nation’s success when it lacks institutional capacity and adequate
investments in research and development to take advantage of market changes related to
free trade (Stiglitz and Charlton 2005, 7, 30, 37, 89). Left alone, markets may not provide
welfare-enhancing effects for a nation, and government intervention may be required to
correct failures to make those markets work efficiently, as industries restructure and less
skilled labor is eliminated (Stiglitz and Charlton 2005, 89). Agriculture, an example of a
restructuring industry, is crucial to the economies of many developing countries with that
sector accounting for as much as 40 percent of GDP and 70 percent of employment
(Stiglitz and Charlton 2005, 120).
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Bulmer-Thomas (2003, 16) documents that the role of tariffs in Latin America
during the nineteenth century was to increase government revenue. Mexican trade policy
evolved into import substitution from 1892 (Bulmer-Thomas 2003, 139) through 1989,
when the Mexican National Development Plan was subsequently implemented by
President Carlos Salinas de Gortari. A dramatic shift in economic policy occurred in
Mexico following the 1982 debt crisis and resulted in the reluctant acceptance by
Mexican authorities of a “New Economic Model (NEM) based on exports” that depended
on a free trade regime (Bulmer-Thomas 2003, 353). Subsequent to implementation of this
NEM the Mexican government did not implement public policies to protect those of its
population most at risk in the shift of its economy to outward looking trade policies.
Bagwell and Staiger (2002, 169) use a partial equilibrium model to explain the
political and economic motivations of governments implementing agricultural subsidies.
Although governments seek, for political reasons, to help their exporters (Bagwell and
Staiger 2002, 31), prices are constrained by market conditions (Bagwell and Staiger
2002, 170) and limit their action. Bagwell and Staiger note that since export-promoting
governments seek to maximize profits less subsidy expenses, while in importing, a
nation’s welfare is measured by consumer surplus, they predict that market inefficiencies
result (Bagwell and Staiger 2002, 171). Preferential Trading Agreements (PTAs) are
subject to negotiation and renegotiation of trade provisions and uncertain enforcement
(Bagwell and Staiger 2002, 114). PTA implementation also involves lengthy transition
timeframes (Bagwell and Staiger 2002, 116), allowing for competing voices in the
political decision process and subsequently sub-optimal outcomes. These processes
undermine the intent and limit the extent of implementation of a free trade regime.
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Modern agricultural export subsidies have been a source of contention dating
from at least the 1958 wheat flour case when “a GATT panel ruled against a French
export subsidy,” stating that it increased the French export market share against Australia
(Bagwell and Staiger 2002, 164). In the 1980s, when a GATT panel ruled against the
United States in favor of the European Community (Bagwell and Staiger 2002, 164) in a
similar wheat flour case, the United States retaliated with an export subsidy, and the
European Community subsequently responded in kind. This resulted in mounting subsidy
war. A major goal of the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations conducted within the
context of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1994 was agricultural
trade reform, and GATT Article XVI was subsequently altered, reducing allowed
agricultural export subsidies of developed nations. Debate occurred between the United
States with the Cairns Group of nations, and between the European Union (EU) and netfood importing countries. The Cairns Group of nations was comprised Argentina,
Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Fiji, Hungary, Indonesia, Malaysia, New
Zealand, the Philippines, Thailand, and Uruguay. The United States and Cairns Group
wanted agricultural subsidies phased out, and the European Union (EU) and net-food
importing countries wanted agricultural subsidies to remain in place (Bagwell and Staiger
2002, 164). The unbalanced trade in feed grains, due to the domestic United States
agricultural subsidies, is said to have resulted in the loss of agricultural employment in
Mexico (Burstein 2007). Hanson (2007, 418), in the context of describing how
globalization affects labor markets, notes a change in income distribution in the 1990s
and lower levels of income for the Mexican poor. Nicita’s (2004) analysis of tariff
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reductions from 1989 to 2000, especially in light of United States agricultural subsidies,
determined that those tariff reductions adversely affected rural Mexican income.
Effect on the Population
Emmott (2003), Bacon (2008), Fayyaz (2008), and Zermeno (2008) note Mexican
policies under free trade that negatively affect the rural poor. The Oxfam Report (2003)
describes the Mexican corn sector being in acute crisis, stating, United States agricultural
policy is directly linked to rural misery in Mexico and that surging imports have been
associated with a steep decline in prices. Nicita (2004, 1) found that from 1989 to 2000
domestic prices of most non-animal agricultural products fell as free trade was introduced
to Mexico, resulting in lower agricultural household income. Although Mexican
households benefited from lower consumption basket prices, the downward pressure on
unskilled wages, found in higher concentrations in rural Mexico, hurt low-income
families more than affluent households.
Hanson (2003, 1) notes that 1980s Mexican trade policy reforms and the 1994
adoption of NAFTA changed Mexico’s wage structure, which included increased demand
for high-skilled workers. This occurred even though, as Hanson notes, “trade theory
predicts that convergence in goods’ prices between countries creates pressure for
convergence in factor prices. In Mexico, this [affects] both wage levels and the relative
wages of low- and high-skilled labor” (Hanson 2003, 2). Mexico’s trade policy reforms,
however, raised the skill premium, a negative effect on an economy with comparatively
less high-skilled workers, and at the same time reduced industry rents going to labor
(Hanson 2003, 3). Though outcomes differ depending on industry and whether it is more
closely aligned to imports or exports, Stopler and Samuelson (1941, 62) note that most
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admit the possibility of a decline in the relative share of a large factor of production such
as labor as a result of free trade; many even admit the possibility of a decline in the real
income of a large factor of production. After demonstrating advantages of free trade for
an economy, Stopler and Samuelson conclude that “if effects on the terms of trade can be
disregarded, it has been shown that the harm which free trade inflicts upon one factor of
production is necessarily less than the gain to the other. Hence, it is always possible to
bribe the suffering factor by subsidy or other redistributive devices so as to leave all
factors better off as a result of trade” (Stopler and Samuelson 1941, 73), and so indicate,
among other things, that rural labor safety nets should remain in place with the
implementation of a free trade regime such as NAFTA. Social safety programs did exist
during the NAFTA implementation, but in phases and with changing policy intent
(Esquivel 2010, 4). Hanson (2003, 3) also found that from 1990 to 2000 the wages of
higher skilled labor and labor in northern Mexican states grew, while labor income
shrank among the less skilled and among laborers in the southernmost Mexican states. In
addition to free trade reform, efforts to implement new economic approaches, and
concurrent with Mexico’s entry into NAFTA, Mexico privatized state-owned enterprises,
deregulated entry restrictions in many industries, and used wage and price restraints
(Hanson 2003, 4). These are policy responses to currency crises, especially in the early
1980s, bouts of high inflation, and severe macroeconomic contractions (Hanson 2003, 3).
Hanson attributes much of the wage disruption in Mexico, following implementation of
free trade regimes from 1985 forward, to the elimination of institutionalized wages
guaranteed to lower skilled workers and, by implication, to the agricultural industry. He
indicates that industries that enjoyed favorable government policy, industry subsidization,
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and subsequently subsidized wages “experienced relatively large reductions in wages and
employment after trade reform” (Hanson 2003, 6). Arbache, Dickerson, and Green
(2004) also show that expected outcomes of free trade on developing countries is varied
and may not be as traditional theory suggests, that is; “not opposite of that in developed
countries” (Arbache et al. 2004, 74).
Arbache, Dickerson, and Green (2004) contend that wage dispersion and the level
of employment in increasing international trade have contributed to the increase in the
dispersion of wages and unemployment.
Arbache, Dickerson, and Green (2004) state that
the most immediate effect of trade [liberalization] is a reduction in the extent to
which domestic manufacturers can operate in protected markets. The reduction or
elimination of trade barriers and tariffs combine to turn any markets that were
previously highly imperfect into markets that are now more contestable, and
hence generate lower prices and reduced producer rents. To the extent that such
rents were previously shared with employees, wages will also fall after trade
[liberalization]” (2004 77).
Effect on the Land
The dominance of imported United States feed grain, especially maize into
Mexico, changes agriculture and land uses. Keleman, Hellin, and Bellon (2009, 52)
document that changes in economic policies related to free trade affect key social systems
that generate and maintain maize landraces in Chiapas, Mexico. In this context landraces
are indigenous cultivated plants commonly grown during earlier periods in human
history, but not used in large-scale modern agriculture. These policy changes relate to the
implementation of free trade and include the “elimination and reorienting of agricultural
subsidies, and changes to the channels through which farmers access technical assistance,
credit and market information” (Keleman et al. 2009, 53). High production costs, coupled
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with low economic returns, make commercial maize farming less attractive for many
small-scale farmers.
Effect of the Free Trade Regime
Nicita uses household survey data to derive the impact of Mexican trade
liberalization on Mexican households by measuring “first-order (or impact) measurement
effects in which the household cannot react to trade-liberalization price changes” (Nicita
2004, 2) and second order effects: “the effects of trade liberalization on household
earnings” (Nicita 2004, 2). Nicita also notes that “geographically dispersed households
will be affected differently by trade liberalization” (Nicita 2004, 2). Throughout the
period from 1989 to 2000 domestic prices of most non-animal agricultural products fell
as free trade was introduced to Mexico. This resulted in lower agricultural household
income due to lower commodity prices. However, all of the Mexican households
benefited from lower consumption basket prices. “Downward pressure on unskilled
wages hurt labor supplied by low-income households,” as the wealthy gained more than
the poor and the northern states gained more real income than those states further south
(Nicita 2004, 7, 30). Nicita (2004, 3, 27) finds that benefits of trade liberalization were
disproportionately distributed to richer urban Mexican households. Northern Mexican
states benefited from Maquiladora industries and proximity to labor opportunities in the
United States.
Harrison (2007) notes that during the last two decades of the 20th century poverty
rates dropped in developing countries as poor countries slashed protective tariffs and
increased their participation in world trade. Ianchovichina, Nicita, and Soloaga (2001)
use a computable general equilibrium model of the Mexican economy to generate prices
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in a simulation to predict the impact of a tariff reform on population welfare. They find
that the “impact of tariff reform on welfare [to] be positive in general for all expenditure
deciles with the poor individuals benefiting proportionately more than the rich”
(Ianchovichina et al. 2001, 19). The real need of the poor Mexican farmers was to receive
income support during the 1990s as the free trade regime was implemented, and during
this period small farmers lost income and large corn farmers gained (Harrison 2007, 4).
Poverty in Mexico increased between 1990 and 2000 (Harrison 2007, 17).
Harrison (2007) chronicles the decline in corn commodity prices and the use of
the Mexican national social safety net for farmers during the implementation of
NAFTA, that
during the 1990s, imports of both white and yellow corn increased, and prices of
Mexican corn fell. The majority of the poorest corn farmers [are] net consumers
of corn and hence benefit . . . from the drop in corn prices. The income from corn
production among middle-income farmers, who are mostly net sellers, fell, both
as a share of total income and in absolute terms. The decline in income from corn
production among . . . net sellers would have translated into an equivalent decline
in real income if farmer incomes had not been supplemented with transfers
through government programs such as PROCAMPO and PROGRESA. (2007, 1)
Also, “evidence shows a clear link between export activity and poverty reduction
in Colombia, Mexico, India, and Poland. This research suggests that efforts to dismantle
barriers to developing-country exports” is beneficial to a nation (Harrison 2007, 27).
Effect of Unbalanced Trade through Subsidies
Export subsidies can be an attractive trading policy, providing cost advantages to
domestic firms competing with similar export firms from other nations (Brander and
Spencer 1985a, 83), and protecting the competitive markets of developing countries
resulting in welfare benefits to the economy as a whole. Export subsidies, however, are
often the agricultural trading policy of developed nations. McMillan, Zwane, and Ashraf
(2007, 183) state “Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)
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countries sell their agricultural products on world markets at prices that are below the
cost of production.” These policies harm poor countries, most of whose poor are farmers,
by depressing world commodity prices. Mexico liberalized its corn sector in the mid1990s, with a subsequently “sharp decrease in the producer price of corn and an increase
in Mexican corn imports from the United States” (McMillan et al. 2007, 185). Since the
poorest of the Mexican farmers produce corn only for personal consumption, they are
only indirectly affected by this reduction of corn prices. Medium sized Mexican farms are
harmed while larger and commercial Mexican farming operations often receive transfer
payments which offset market losses. The general population of developing countries
does benefit from lower grain commodity prices (McMillan et al. 2007, 186). Findings
indicate that 1) poorer countries are net importers of both cereals and food, 2) suppressed
agricultural prices as a result of OECD subsidies benefit poor country consumers, and the
poorest in these countries the most, 3) “NAFTA reduced the wedge between the real
producer price and the border price, making corn production less profitable” (McMillan
et al. 2007, 228), and 4) “the poorest corn farmers are net food buyers, since they have
little land per person and so are forced to earn cash income in other ways in order to buy
food” (McMillan et al. 2007, 228).
Aisbett (2007, 41) emphasizes the importance of “identifying the causal
mechanisms through which globalization affects the poor” and how a free trade regime is
implemented, which often affects the condition of the poor and subsequent political
reaction (Aisbett 2007, 34). Free trade can be evaluated by assessing trade restriction
levels or assessing a country’s integration by measuring the flows of “goods, services,
factors, and profits into and out of the country” (Aisbett 2007, 35). Subsidies are similar
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to tariffs, and so are inconsistent with free trade, with respect to the first measure.
However, subsidies tend to increase integration of trade with the rest of the world and
may be seen as consistent with free trade by this second measure.
Porto (2003) notes that studies on the relationship between trade and poverty in
developing countries focus on the effects of national trade reforms, while WTO
negotiations, especially as seen in the Doha Round, were more concerned with the
poverty effects on low-income countries of foreign reforms, such as the elimination of
agricultural subsidies in developed economies. Porto found that, in the case of Argentina
participating in the MERCOSUR regional trade agreement (Porto 2003, 13), “national
trade reforms have larger marginal effects than foreign trade reforms, [but] since there is
greater room for foreign reforms, policy changes in developed countries . . . have, in the
end, larger poverty impacts,” and thus it is more important to the reduction of poverty for
a country than its own policy reforms (Porto 2003, 1, 18).
Summary
Research has documented that unbalanced trade between the United States and
Mexico has increased the standards of living of the general population of Mexico, while
among the rural poor it may have increased poverty and inequality, increasing political
discontent and less than optimal land use. New policies produce winners and losers, and
these changes are consistent with Bhagwati (2004), and Stiglitz and Charlton’s (2005)
views of development. The implementation of free trade policies between the United
States and Mexico began in the 1980s, and was fully implemented with NAFTA. The
unintended consequences of subsidized products from the United States have an adverse
impact on the small and medium sized rural agriculture in Mexico. Mexican government
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policies were less effective than needed in providing necessary safety nets for its rural
population, especially during times of crisis such as the 1994-96 currency crisis.
Theoretical Framework
Contention between those for and opposed to free trade have evolved to some
extent because of the lack of connections made between “empirical findings and policy
conclusions” (Aisbett 2007, 40). Reimer discusses “cross-country regression analyses,
partial equilibrium/costs-of-living analyses, general equilibrium studies and micro-macro
syntheses” as viable research methods to assess the impact of globalization (2002, 7).
Aisbett adds to this list the need for “microeconomic studies that test specific
mechanisms (other than prices) through which globalization is believed to impact the
poor” (2007, 38).
Bagwell and Staiger (2002) demonstrate the theoretical basis of lost domestic
productivity with unbalanced trade. The United States export market, although composed
of producers in a perfectly competitive market, because of its advanced structure, is
controlled by a smaller number of agricultural aggregator firms. This forms an
imperfectly competitive (Cournot) market noted by Bagwell and Staiger (2002, 169),
Brander (1995), and Helpman and Krugman (1989, 88). It is in this context of free trade
under the NAFTA trade regime that continued United States domestic subsidies of feed
grains, especially maize, is said to have subsequently contributed to a reduction in
welfare in rural Mexico (Burstein, 2007). Although explanation of the effects of free
trade within an imperfect market may allow for the use of strategic-trade theory espoused
by Brander and Spencer (1985a, 1), the inclusive hybrid trade theory of Bagwell and
Staiger provides a more comprehensive and versatile explanation of agricultural disputes
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(2002, 169). A partial equilibrium model of trade exists in competitive markets. Although
due to transportation costs feed grains from the United States predominate, this model
demonstrates that prices in the importing market tend to be lower (Bagwell and Staiger
2002, 170) than local Mexican production.
Measurements of well-being and poverty are changing in the 21st century.
Stiglitz, Sen, and Fitoussi (2009) contend that national income statistics, originally
intended to measure market economic activity do not adequately measure societal wellbeing. They recommend focus on the median of the data used as being more reflective of
general societal well-being than averages. They also remind us that a significant amount
of economic activity occurs within the home. These approaches are reflected in Attanasio
and Szekely’s (2001, 6, 24, 33) discussion of poverty, adding to poverty measurement,
personal assets, human capital, and redistribution effects. Szekely (2005, 927) and
Esquivel (2010, 2) add inequality. The Mexican national Social Development policy
Evaluation National Council (CONEVAL, 2009) data reflect these changing measures.
Hernandez and Szekely note in their work on poverty alleviation strategies for
Mexico that limited information hampers use of statistical techniques “to determine the
significance of the underlying relationships” between poverty and macroeconomic
variables (2009, 36). They accept that their conclusions are limited and will be verified
with more complete information and alternate statistical approaches. Each additional
survey year provides data that improves the validity of findings. They note that, although
it is necessary to obtain the longest possible time-series data on macroeconomic
performance and on poverty levels, data is limited for Mexico. Similar to Szekely’s
(2005) approach this work extends the boundaries of previous research by evaluating the
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effects of causal variables on multiple definitions of rural Mexican welfare. These
include measures of Mexican rural poverty from the World Bank, poverty headcount
ratios from the Socio-Economic Database for Latin America and the Caribbean
(SEDLAC), and the Consejo Nacional De Evaluacion de la Politica de Desarrolo Social
(CONEVAL) estimates of poverty based on the Instituto Nacional de Estadistica y
Geografia (ENIGH) data.
Hernandez and Szekely (2009, 37) use time-series poverty estimates constructed
by Szekely (2005) for the years through 1989 and data from CONEVAL for 1992-2006 .
Szekely (2005, 913) presents an “historical series of poverty and inequality in Mexico for
the period 1950-2004,” but also relies on limited years of data collection throughout that
period, seven surveys that include poverty assessment conducted between 1950 and 1977,
and beginning in 1984 as the National Institute of Statistics, Geography and Informatics
(INEGI) began to perform the National Survey of Income and Expenditure (ENIGH) on a
biannual basis. Szekely (2005, 923) limits his analysis to only 15 points (years) of
reliable data. Szekely (2005, 919) expands views of poverty from measuring only
personal and household income to include measuring food poverty, or the inability to
obtain the basic food basket, measuring capability poverty that includes access to
medicine and education, and measuring poverty heritage that includes measuring limits
on access to clothing, housing, and transportation. Szekely (2005, 927) is cautious about
the robustness of his model predicting poverty and inequality in Mexico, and this due to
the lack of access to household micro-data, the limited number of observations available
and the potential effect of unknown variables over five decades. He finds, however, if the
GINI coefficient is used as a proxy for Mexican population welfare, poverty and
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inequality are positively correlated from 1950 to 2004. Szekely also finds (2005, 928)
poverty and inflation are positively correlated over the same period. Szekely maintains
that inflation affects the poor most as they have less ability to protect their income and
assets from steady increases in the price level. Szekely (2005, 923) finds that poverty
declined between 1950 and 1984, remained flat between 1984 and 1994, increased
through 1996, and then decreased through the balance of the period studied. Szekely
(2005, 925) finds that inequality followed an inverted U Kuznets curve between 1950 and
1984, increased from 1984 and then reduced after 2000. CONEVAL also provides details
of food poverty, capabilities poverty and heritage poverty for both rural and urban
sectors, but only bi-annually from 1992. Esquivel (2010, 4) describes Mexican phases of
growth to include social protection, including “non-targeted social programs
(Solidaridad)” from 1982-1994, targeted programs in rural areas: Progresa and Procampo
from 1994-2000, and Progresa expanding to urban areas from 2000-2006.
Hernandez and Szekely (2009, 39, 40) hold that recent poverty estimates are more
accurate than older estimates. They find that policies that ensure economic growth,
stabilize the economy and include social spending benefit the poor. Attanasio and
Szekely (2001, 5) add that more than wages, assets affect poverty. These include personal
physical capital of financial assets, property, and any other concrete forms of capital that
can be used in production, and the social capital of interpersonal relationships and
commitments of and to others within a cultural context. Szekely (2001, 241) describes
changes in social policies in terms of generations of policies with different focuses and
intended outcomes. Some have been built on the premise that economic growth enhances
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the welfare of the poor, but others have been established on the premise that the
correlation between economic growth and increased welfare for the poor is less clear.
For this study CONEVAL provides poverty rates for 1992, 1994, 1996, 1998,
2000, 2002, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2008 and 2010. Although CONEVAL collects an
increasing amount of poverty data, it collects national and state data every two years and
municipality data every five years as required by the General Law of Social Development
(CONEVAL 2009). The inadequate amount of Mexican municipal data limits effective
use of this information for time-series assessment at the municipal level. Other rural
poverty data such as poverty headcount ratio at the rural poverty line from The World
Bank and FGT poverty indicators (Foster, Greer, and Thorbecke 1984) from the SocioEconomic Database for Latin America and the Caribbean (SEDLAC) are used. These
also are limited to data from 1989 and from even numbered years beginning with 1992.
Since much of the literature and especially Szekely (2001) and Esquivel (2010)
note separate economic development phases in Mexico, and each with correspondingly
different social programs and aid to the rural sector, composite measures of Mexican
national government support are used. These include Producer Support Estimate (PSE)
and the General Services Support Estimate (GSSE) and the with the Consumer Support
Estimate (CSE) noted by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) and are used to compare to composite effects on rural poverty
This research assesses the impact of Mexican governmental influence through
subsidies on rural personal welfare quantified as proxies in three categories of Mexican
agricultural subsidies and the external economic pressures on rural Mexico exerted by
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Mexican imports of corn on measures of poverty. Poverty is measured as a percent of the
population, relative poverty gaps, and poverty and inequality among the rural poor.
Methodology
Personal rural welfare in Mexico, as noted by Stiglitz et al. (2009), Szekely
(2005), and Esquivel (2010), and as prescribed by CONEVAL (2009) is assessed with
different variables. This research assesses causal impact on sixteen separate measures of
rural Mexican welfare. Szekely’s choice of these measures is similar to decomposable
poverty measures (FGT) proposed by Foster et al. (1984) and used by Socio-Economic
Database for Latin America and the Caribbean (SEDLAC) and the World Bank. Foster et
al. (1984) measure a simple headcount ratio, FGT0, poverty gap, FGT1, and a measure
that combines poverty and income inequality among the poor, FGT2. Twelve years of
data are clearly identified for the twenty-two year period from 1989 to 2010.
This research evaluates independent variables using multiple linear regression
models, each with different measures of Mexican rural welfare (dependent variable) to
determine the effect of the independent variables on personal rural welfare. These are
summarized in Table 10.
Table 10
Poverty Indicator Summary
________________________________________________________________________
Source
Poverty Definition
________________________________________________________________________
World DataBank, World Development Indicators (WDI) and Global Development
Finance (GDF)
SI.POV.RUHC Poverty Headcount Ratio at Rural Poverty Line (percent of
Rural Population)
________________________________________________________________________
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Table 10 (continued).
________________________________________________________________________
Source
Poverty Definition
________________________________________________________________________
Socio-Economic Database for Latin America and the Caribbean (SEDLAC)
Poverty headcount ratios published by Latin American and Caribbean
governments, and several individual poverty indicators computed following
SEDLAC methodology, and using two international poverty lines: USD $2.50
and $4.00 per day at 2005 PPP. The USD $ 2.50 line coincides with the median
of the extreme poverty lines chosen by the governments of the Latin American
countries. The USD $ 4.00 line is similar to the median of the official moderate
poverty lines. These are shown below.
USD 2.5 a Day Poverty Line
Rural Headcount FGT(0)
Poverty Gap FGT(1)
Poverty and Inequality FGT (2)
USD 4 a Day Poverty Line
Rural Headcount FGT(0)
Poverty Gap FGT(1)
Poverty and Inequality FGT (2)
Poverty Lines: 50 percent Median household per capita income
Rural Headcount FGT(0)
Poverty Gap FGT(1)
Poverty and Inequality FGT (2)
CONEVAL. Estimates of the CONEVAL with basis in the ENIGH from 1992 to 2010:
Rural Income Poverty by Person:
"Food poverty: Insufficient income to acquire the basic food basket, even if use
is made of all the disposable income in the home exclusively for the purchase of
these goods." (CONEVAL, 2010, under “Glossary”)
"Poverty of capabilities: Inadequate incomes to purchase the food basket and
carry out the necessary expenditure on health and education, even if use is made
of all the disposable income in the home exclusively for the purchase of these
goods and services." (CONEVAL, 2010, under “Glossary”)
"Poverty of heritage: Inadequacy of the disposable income to purchase the food
basket and carry out the necessary expenditure on health, education, clothing,
________________________________________________________________________
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Table 10 (continued).
________________________________________________________________________
Source
Poverty Definition
________________________________________________________________________
housing and transportation, even if use is made of all the disposable income in
the home exclusively for the purchase of these goods and services."
(CONEVAL, 2010, under “Glossary”)
Rural Income Poverty by Household:
"Food poverty: Insufficient income to acquire the basic food basket, even if use
is made of all the disposable income in the home exclusively for the purchase of
these goods." (CONEVAL, 2010, under “Glossary”)
"Poverty of capabilities: Inadequate incomes to purchase the food basket and
carry out the necessary expenditure on health and education, even if use is made
of all the disposable income in the home exclusively for the purchase of these
goods and services." (CONEVAL, 2010, under “Glossary”)
"Poverty of heritage: Inadequacy of the disposable income to purchase the food
basket and carry out the necessary expenditure on health, education, clothing,
housing and transportation, even if use is made of all the disposable income in
the home exclusively for the purchase of these goods and services."
(CONEVAL, 2010, under “Glossary”)
________________________________________________________________________
The independent variables include four categories of data that may affect welfare.
These include corn trade imbalances between the United States and Mexico measured as
the annual tonnage of Mexican imports of corn from the United States, Mexican national
government subsidies to producers per the Producer Support Estimate (PSE), general
support of the Mexican agricultural sector per the General Services Support Estimate
(GSSE), and Mexican consumer subsidies per the Consumer Support Estimate (CSE).
The government support estimates summarize all forms of Mexican government
agricultural support and provide a comprehensive and consistent summary of various aid
programs implemented through stages of development in the Mexican economy noted by
Esquivel (2010, 4). Throughout the literature and among data sources, reference to the
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quantity and significance of private investment in Mexican agricultural production, as
seen in the ASTI database (Total Agricultural R and D Spending, Agricultural Science
and Technology Indicators), is amazingly scarce.
The linear relationships for each of the measures of personal rural welfare are
shown as:
Y = B0 + B1x1 + … Bnxtn + Ut
Such that, PRW = f (UFGT, PS, GS, CS), where PRW reflects sixteen separate measures
of personal rural welfare in Mexico. UFGT is the tonnage of Mexican imports of corn
from the United States. This data is from the United States Department of Agriculture,
Foreign Agricultural Service. PS is Mexican Producer Support Subsidies (PSE), GS is
Mexican General Services Support Subsidies (GSSE), and CS is Consumer Support
Subsidies (CSE). These data are from the Organization for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD).
Sixteen measures of personal rural welfare (PRW) are separately evaluated as the
dependent variable in sixteen separate regressions. These separate regression models are
used to broaden the perspectives of Mexican rural poverty and add to the validity of
findings of this research over the twenty-two year period in this study. Mexican poverty
headcount ratio at the rural poverty line, as a percent of the rural Mexican population;
from the World Bank is one. Nine separate Foster, Greer, and Thorbecke (FGT)
generalized measures of poverty are also evaluated. These are measures of the percent of
the rural Mexican population and are drawn from the Socio-Economic Database for Latin
America and the Caribbean (SEDLAC). Simple rural headcount ratio, FGT0, the average
rural poverty gap FGT1, and the combined poverty and income inequality among the rural
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poor, FGT2, are each assessed for three measures of rural poverty. They each include
USD $2.50 a day rural poverty line (2005 PPP), USD $4.00 a day rural poverty line
(2005 PPP), and 50 percent median rural household per capita income (2005 PPP).
Szekely’s (2005, 923) food poverty, capability poverty, and heritage poverty for
individual rural and household rural income data are also assessed as dependent variables
to isolate and confirm the effect of the independent variables on personal rural welfare.
These data are also measures of the percent of the rural Mexican population and are
drawn from the CONEVAL database. Each of these sixteen measures of personal rural
welfare is treated as a dependent variable in regressions that span twelve, or in the case of
CONEVAL data, eleven of the twenty-two years from 1989 to 2010, as shown in Table
11.
Table 11
Poverty Regression Variable Data by Year
________________________________________________________________________
Personal Rural Welfare

1989 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000
2002 2004 2005 2006 2008 2010
________________________________________________________________________
Mexican rural poverty (percent of rural population) World Bank:
66.5 69.3 80.7
64.3 57.4 61.8 54.7

75.9
60.8

69.2
60.8

USD 2.5 a Day Poverty Line SEDLAC:
Rural Headcount FGT(0)
35.5
39.3

39.4
32.5

40.6
30.3

59.2
24.9

55.0
30.2

47.1
27.8

Poverty Gap FGT(1)

14.8
15.6

15.2
13.8

16.0
12.1

28.3
8.7

24.9
11.4

20.1
10.9

Personal Rural Welfare

1989
2002

1992
2004

1994
2005

1996
2006

1998
2008

2000
2010
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________________________________________________________________________
Table 11 (continued).
________________________________________________________________________
Personal Rural Welfare

1989 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000
2002 2004 2005 2006 2008 2010
________________________________________________________________________
Poverty and Inequality FGT (2)

8.7
8.4

USD 4 a Day Poverty Line – SEDLAC:
Rural Head count FGT(0)
59.4
63.1

7.9
7.7

8.6
6.7

17.7
4.4

14.6
6.1

11.5
5.9

62.0
54.2

64.9
51.8

78.8
46.6

73.9
51.8

69.6
47.9

Poverty Gap FGT(1)

27.4
29.1

29.0
25.1

30.0
23.1

44.0
19.1

40.1
22.6

34.8
21.0

Poverty and Inequality FGT (2)

16.6
17.3

17.0
15.2

17.8
13.6

29.6
10.4

26.1
13.0

21.8
12.3

Poverty Lines: 50 percent Median household per capita income – SEDLAC:
Rural Head count FGT(0)
32.6 44.1 45.7 45.4 51.1 51.2
45.6 40.4 39.8 37.5 40.9 35.7
Poverty Gap FGT(1)

13.3
18.7

17.3
17.5

18.7
16.5

20.6
14.1

22.7
16.9

22.3
15.0

Poverty and Inequality FGT (2)

7.9
10.3

9.1
10.1

10.2
9.4

12.5
7.4

13.1
9.4

12.9
8.4

34.0

34.0
28.0

37.0
32.3

53.5
24.1

51.7
31.3

42.4
29.3

42.6

44.1
36.2

47.5
39.8

62.6
32.2

59.0
38.5

49.9
37.8

64.3

66.5
57.4

69.3
61.8

80.7
54.1

75.9
60.3

69.2
60.8

CONEVAL:
Rural food per person
Rural capacity per person

Rural heritage per person

Personal Rural Welfare

1989 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000
2002 2004 2005 2006 2008 2010
________________________________________________________________________
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Table 11 (continued).
________________________________________________________________________
Personal Rural Welfare

1989 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000
2002 2004 2005 2006 2008 2010
________________________________________________________________________
Rural food per Household
27.8

28.0
22.9

30.1
26.1

44.1
19.1

43.5
25.8

34.1
23.9

35.4

36.6
29.9

39.4
32.9

53.4
26.0

50.9
32.2

41.3
31.6

56.0

58.2
49.3

61.1
53.9

73.1
46.7

69.6
53.1

60.7
54.2

4.0
2.5

4.0
2.0

4.0
2.0

4.0
2.0

3.0
2.5

2.0
2.5

Mexican imports of U.S. Corn (DV) Million Metric Tons
4856 521
3002
5288 5885 6336

3162
8768

5454
7841

5945
7488

Rural capacity per Household

Rural heritage per Household
Independent Variables:
Mexican Political participation (IV)

Producer Support Estimate (PSE) - (MXN million)
6421 25689 23737 11712 47511 69918
89137 47766 54275 60797 70406 78553
General Services Support Estimate (GSSE) - (MXN million)
1733 3411 3956 4111
6078 9288 8873 8449

3818
9316

5941
10984

Consumer Support Estimate (CSE) - (MXN million)
(2121) (18884)(11217) 1542(31849)(51199)
(68471)(19667)(19088)(19665)(961)(21382)
________________________________________________________________________
The research question is whether and to what extent Mexican corn imports from
the United States or changes in Mexican agricultural subsidies affect rural Mexican
poverty? The hypotheses reflect each of these affects. For corn imports into Mexico:
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Ho: There is not a measurable increase in poverty in rural Mexico as a result of
increases in Mexican imports of corn from the United States, especially since the
implementation of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).
H1: There is a measurable increase in poverty in rural Mexico as a result of
increases in Mexican imports of corn from the United States, especially since the
implementation of NAFTA.
The hypothesis of the Mexican agricultural subsidy effect on rural Mexican
welfare:
Ho: Increases in Mexican agricultural subsidies result in no measurable decreases
in poverty in rural Mexico, especially since the implementation of the North American
Free Trade Agreement NAFTA.
H1: There is a measureable decrease in poverty in rural Mexico as a result of
increases in Mexican government agricultural support measured in government support
estimates, especially since the implementation of NAFTA.
Findings
Multiple measures of personal rural welfare, dependent variables, are individually
regressed on four independent variables: Mexican corn imports from the United States,
Mexican Producer Support Estimate (PSE) subsidies, Mexican General Services Support
Estimate (GSSE) subsidies, and Mexican Consumer Support Estimate (CSE) subsidies to
determine the effect of these causal variables on different measures of rural Mexican
poverty. The nine regression models using Socio-Economic Database for Latin America
and the Caribbean (SEDLAC) data are not found acceptable because of low R-squared
values and poor significance levels of models. The results from this data are inclusive.
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These multiple linear regression models include the percent of rural population with USD
2.50 a day rural headcount (FGT0) for the poverty gap (FGT1) and the poverty and
inequality (FGT2). Those surveyed with somewhat more secure financial standing at USD
$4.00 per day including FGT0, FGT1, and FGT2, and rural median 50 percent poverty line
including FGT0, FGT1, and FGT2 also possessed low R-squared values and poor model
levels of significance and, therefore, are not useful predictive models.
The model for the Mexican poverty headcount ratio at the rural poverty line to the
rural population, from World Bank data, provides meaningful predictive power between
the independent variables and this measure of personal rural welfare. The model
coefficient of determination, R-squared, is sufficiently robust to assess individual
independent variables for causality at .620 and .380, respectively. The R-squared is
important to this research as it adjusts for an increase in independent variables and for
limited observations in the model. The model significance, the p value for F, is .1483. Of
the independent variables regressed on Mexican poverty headcount ratio, only the
Mexican GSSE provides a meaningful single tail p-value of .073. Its corresponding
measure of magnitude, coefficient, is -.0027032. This means that for every million pesos
expended by the Mexican government in general services support estimate (GSSE)
subsidies the Mexican poverty headcount ratio at the rural poverty line decreases by .27.
Since the average and median measures of Mexican poverty headcount over the period
studied are 65.5 and 64.3, respectively, for an additional million pesos expended this
measure of poverty reduces to 65.21 and 64.03.
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Table 12
Summary Regression Results by Poverty Indicator
________________________________________________________________________
Poverty Indicators
________________________________________________________________________
Source --------------- Model ------------------

-------------------------- Variables -------------------------

R Square Adj R Square Obs. Sig. F
IV
Coef p-value1-tail
________________________________________________________________________
Poverty Headcount Ratio at Rural Poverty Line percent of Rural Population:
0.6202 0.3803 11 0.1453
GSSE -0.0027032 0.136
0.073
USD 2.5 a Day Poverty Line - Rural Headcount FGT(0):
0.4552 0.1440 12 0.3094
No variables with significant p-values
USD 2.5 a Day Poverty Line - Poverty Gap FGT(1):
0.3701 0.0101 12 0.4554
No variables with significant p-values
USD 2.5 a Day Poverty Line - Poverty and Inequality FGT (2):
0.3333 -0.0477 12 0.5243
No variables with significant p-values
USD 4 a Day Poverty Line - Rural Headcount FGT(0):
0.5729 0.3288 12 0.4099
No variables with significant p-values
USD 4 a Day Poverty Line - Poverty Gap FGT(1):
0.4530 0.1404 12 0.3130
No variables with significant p-values
USD 4 a Day Poverty Line - Poverty and Inequality FGT (2):
0.3953 0.0497 12 0.4097
No variables with significant p-values
Poverty Lines: 50 percent Median household per capita income - Rural Headcount
FGT(0):
0.4307 0.1054 12 0.4391
No variables with significant p-values
Poverty Lines: 50 percent Median household per capita income - Poverty Gap FGT(1):
0.2980 -0.1078 12 0.5980
No variables with significant p-values
Poverty Lines: 50 percent Median household per capita income - Poverty and Inequality
FGT (2):
0.2111 -0.2397 12 0.7583
No variables with significant p-values
________________________________________________________________________
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Table 12 (continued).
________________________________________________________________________
Poverty Indicators
Source --------------- Model ------------------

-------------------------- Variables -------------------------

R Square Adj R Square Obs. Sig. F
IV
Coef p-value1-tail
________________________________________________________________________
Rural income food poverty, by person:
0.5610 0.2683 11 0.2270

GSSE

-0.0034829

Rural income poverty of capabilities, by person:
0.6154 0.3591 11 0.1619
GSSE -0.003753

0.138

0.129

0.069

0.0645

Rural income poverty of heritage, by person:
0.6256 0.3760 11 0.1510
GSSE

-0.0027038

0.137

0.0682

Rural income food poverty, by household:
0.5583 0.2638 11 0.2306
GSSE

-0.0030267

0.132

0.062

Rural income poverty of capabilities, by household:
0.5961 0.3269 11 0.1837
GSSE -0.0030664

0.133

0.0665

Rural income poverty of heritage, by household:
0.5958 0.3264 11 0.1840
GSSE -0.0029123 0.129 0.0645
________________________________________________________________________
The six models in which a proxy for personal rural welfare data, from the
Mexican National Council for Evaluation of the Social Development Policy
(CONEVAL), is regressed on the independent variables of Mexican corn imports, PSE,
GSSE, and CSE provide meaningful predictive power between the independent variables
and the associated measures of personal rural welfare.
The percent rural income food poverty by person of the total rural population
model has a coefficient of determination, R-squared, that is sufficiently robust to assess
individual independent variables for causality at .561 and .268, respectively. The model

75

significance is .2270. Of the independent variables regressed on percent rural income
food poverty by person, only the Mexican GSSE provides a meaningful p-value of .138
with a single tail value of .069. Its corresponding measure of magnitude, coefficient, is
-.0034829. This means that for every million pesos expended by the Mexican government
in general services support estimate (GSSE) subsidies the Mexican percent rural income
food poverty per person decreases by .34. Since the average and median measures of
percent rural income poverty by person over the period studied are 36.1 and 34,
respectively, for an additional million pesos expended this measure of poverty reduces to
35.80 and 33.62.
The percent rural income poverty of capabilities by person of the total rural
population model has a coefficient of determination, R-squared, that is sufficiently robust
to assess individual independent variables for causality at .615 and .359, respectively.
The model significance is .1619. Of the independent variables regressed on percent rural
income poverty of capabilities by person, only the Mexican GSSE provides a meaningful
p-value of .129 with a single tail value of .065. Its corresponding measure of magnitude,
coefficient, is -.003753. This means that for every million pesos expended by the
Mexican government in general services support estimate (GSSE) subsidies the Mexican
percent rural income poverty of capabilities per person decreases by .38. Since the
average and median measures of percent rural income poverty of capabilities by person
over the period studied are 44.6 and 42.6, respectively, for an additional million pesos
expended this measure of poverty reduces to 44.23 and 42.23.
The percent rural income poverty of heritage by person of the total rural
population model has a coefficient of determination, R-squared, that is sufficiently robust

76

to assess individual independent variables for causality at .626 and .376, respectively.
The model significance is .1510. Of the independent variables regressed on percent rural
income poverty of heritage by person, only the Mexican GSSE provides a meaningful pvalue of .137 with a single tail value of .068. Its corresponding measure of magnitude,
coefficient, is -.002704. This means that for every million pesos expended by the
Mexican government in general services support estimate (GSSE) subsidies the Mexican
percent rural income poverty of heritage per person decreases by .27. Since the average
and median measures of percent rural income poverty of heritage by person over the
period studied are 65.5 and 64.3, respectively, for an additional million pesos expended
this measure of poverty reduces to 65.23 and 64.03.
The percent rural income food poverty by household of the total rural population
model has a coefficient of determination, R-squared, that is sufficiently robust to assess
individual independent variables for causality at .558 and .264, respectively. The model
significance is .2306. Of the independent variables regressed on percent rural income
food poverty by person, only the Mexican GSSE provides a meaningful p-value of .132
with a single tail value of .062. Its corresponding measure of magnitude, coefficient, is
-.0030267. This means that for every million pesos expended by the Mexican government
in general services support estimate (GSSE) subsidies the Mexican percent rural income
food poverty per person decreases by .31. Since the average and median measures of
percent rural income poverty by household over the period studied are 29.6 and 27.8,
respectively, for an additional million pesos expended this measure of poverty reduces to
29.3 and 27.5.
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The percent rural income food poverty by household of the total rural population
model has a coefficient of determination, R-squared, that is sufficiently robust to assess
individual independent variables for causality at .596 and .327, respectively. The model
significance is .1837. Of the independent variables regressed on percent rural income
food poverty by person, only the Mexican GSSE provides a meaningful p-value of .133
with a single tail value of .0665. Its corresponding measure of magnitude, coefficient, is
-.0030664. This means that for every million pesos expended by the Mexican government
in general services support estimate (GSSE) subsidies the Mexican percent rural income
food poverty per person decreases by .31. Since the average and median measures of
percent rural income poverty by household over the period studied are 37.2 and 35.4,
respectively, for an additional million pesos expended this measure of poverty reduces to
36.9 and 35.1.
The percent rural income poverty of heritage by household of the total rural
population model has a coefficient of determination, R-squared, that is sufficiently robust
to assess individual independent variables for causality at .596 and .326, respectively.
The model significance is .1840. Of the independent variables regressed on percent rural
income poverty of heritage by person, only the Mexican GSSE provides a meaningful pvalue of .129 with a single tail value of .0645. Its corresponding measure of magnitude,
coefficient, is -.0029123. This means that for every million pesos expended by the
Mexican government in general services support estimate (GSSE) subsidies the Mexican
percent rural income poverty of heritage per person decreases by .29. Since the average
and median measures of percent rural income poverty of heritage by household over the
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period studied are 57.8 and 56, respectively, for an additional million pesos expended this
measure of poverty reduces to 57.51 and 55.71.
Since the models do not indicate relation between the Mexican corn imports from
the United States and Mexican rural poverty the null hypothesis cannot be rejected and
there is no evidence from the data that poverty in rural Mexico is predicted by increases
of Mexican imports of corn from the United States. This is also true of the producer
(PSE) and consumer (CSE) Mexican government agricultural subsidies. The null
hypotheses for these subsidies cannot be rejected. There is, however, reasonable
evidence from the World Bank data and all measures of poverty from CONEVAL that
agricultural infrastructure (GSSE) expenditures predict lower levels of Mexican rural
poverty. The null hypotheses for these causal variables are rejected.
Analysis
Although rural Mexican welfare is presented in several peer reviewed databases,
the rural Mexican poverty data has its origin in the Encuesta Nacional de Ingresos y
Gastos de los Hogares (ENIGH) or National Household Income and Expenditure
Surveys. Though rural poverty data is collected biannually the ENIGH surveys are the
best and closest to the source of the data we have for measures of rural Mexican welfare.
Szekely (2005) underscores that though some of this data has been collected under the
auspices of various Mexican government agencies since 1950, more recent data
collection under the direction of the National Institute of Statistics and Geography
(INEGI) is both more consistent from year to year and more reliable.
Findings indicate that measures of Mexican rural headcount ratio, noted by the
World Bank, and Mexican rural income percentages, noted by CONEVAL, are predicted
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by the causal variables used in these models, whereas the measures associated by the
rural poverty lines, noted by SEDLAC, are not. A significant portion of the variation in
the measures of rural poverty, the dependent variables from the World Bank and
CONEVAL is predicted by the independent variables in these models.
Table 13
Model Level Regression Summary
________________________________________________________________________
Source/
Adj
Model
R Square R Square Obs. Sig. F
________________________________________________________________________
World Bank:
1. Poverty Headcount Ratio

0.6202

0.3803

11

0.1453

2. Rural income food poverty by person

0.5610

0.2683

11

0.2270

3. Rural income poverty of capability by person

0.6154

0.3591

11

0.1619

4. Rural income poverty of heritage by person

0.6256

0.3760

11

0.1510

5. Rural income food poverty by household

0.5583

0.2638

11

0.2306

6. Rural income poverty of capability by household 0.5961

0.3269

11

0.1837

CONEVAL:

7. Rural income poverty of heritage by household 0.5958 0.3264 11 0.1840
________________________________________________________________________
When adjusted for the limited number of observations, R-squared, these models
predict from 26 to 38 percent of the variation in the various measures of rural Mexican
poverty. In all of these seven models the General Services Support Estimate (GSSE) is
found to have significance above 90 percent. Mexican imports of corn from the United
States and other subsidy measures (PSE and CSE) do not. The GSSE one-tail p-values
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fall between .0620 and .0730. The GSSE also have negative coefficients, indicating that
as the Mexican GSSE increases, rural Mexican poverty levels decrease. Among these
seven models the effect size of these coefficients ranges from .27 to .34, indicating that
for every million pesos invested in the GSSE the corresponding Mexican rural poverty
percent decreases by those amounts. Although the weakness of the models exists due to
observational limitations resulting in relatively less robust predictability at the model
level, these coefficients are significant. All seven of these models indicate that for every
three million pesos additionally invested by the Mexican government in GSSE, the
survey estimates of rural Mexican poverty decrease by approximately one percent.
Durbin-Watson test of the model reveals Durbin-Watson Statistic D values for the
independent variables with significant p-values between the lower critical value DL and
the upper critical value DU, indicating inability to determine positive autocorrelation of
this data set with the Durbin-Watson test.
Table 14
Durbin-Watson Statistic Values
________________________________________________________________________
Model, IV
k n
D
DW table used DL
DU
________________________________________________________________________
PRW01, GSSE

5

11 0.460234

5%

0.315

2.645

PRW11, GSSE

5

11 0.489823

5%

0.315

2.645

PRW12, GSSE

5

11 0.421903

5%

0.315

2.645

PRW13, GSSE

5

11 0.459180

5%

0.315

2.645

PRW14, GSSE

5

11 0.482034

5%

0.315

2.645

PRW15, GSSE 5 11 0.406122
5%
0.315 2.645
________________________________________________________________________
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Table 14 (continued).
________________________________________________________________________
Model, IV
k n
D
DW table used DL
DU
________________________________________________________________________
PRW16, GSSE 5 11 0.422259
5%
0.315 2.645
________________________________________________________________________
Time series plot summaries or trend graphs for these data show significant trends
in the data throughout the period studied. Mexican imports of maize dramatically
increased through the period from 521 Million Metric Tons (MMT) in 1992 to 7,480
MMT in 2010, a thirteen-fold increase. The Mexican Producer Support Estimate (PSE)
and the Mexican General Services Support Estimate (GSSE) significantly increased
through the period, while the Mexican Consumer Support Estimate (CSE) remained flat.
The PSE increased from 25.688 billion pesos in 1992 to 78.552 billion pesos in 2010, a
two-fold increase, and the GSSE increased from 3.410 billion pesos in 1992 to 10.983
billion pesos in 2010, also a two-fold increase throughout the period. The CSE from 1992
to 2010 increased at a much slower rate from -18.844 billion pesos to -21.382 billion
pesos. It is important to note that CSE expenditures are defined as negative expenditures.
All of the causal variables examined dropped measurably during the 1995 peso crisis in
Mexico.

Figure 8. Mexican imports of United States corn in Million Metric Tons.
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Figure 9. Producer Support Estimate (PSE)-(MXN million).

Figure 10. General Services Support Estimate (GSSE)-(MXN million).

Figure 11. Consumer Support Estimate (CSE)-(MXN million).
It is also significant that all measures of Mexican rural poverty trended down over
the twenty-two year period, but all measures of Mexican rural poverty increased
measurably during the 1995 Mexican peso crisis. Since these values measure population
poverty rates, real rural income is implied over the period studied. Mexican rural poverty
trends of significant models of poverty trends are shown in Figures 12 through 18.
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Mexican rural poverty trends of less significant models also show similar patterns of
decreasing poverty and are included in Figures 19 through 27.

Figure 12. Significant models: Mexican rural poverty percent of rural population-World
Bank.

Figure 13. Significant models: Mexican percent personal food-evolution of income
poverty-CONEVAL.

Figure 14. Significant models: Mexican percent personal capacity-evolution of income
poverty-CONEVAL.
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PRW: Mexican Percent Personal
Heritage - Evolution of income
poverty - CONEVAL
PRW: Mexican Percent Personal Heritage - Evolution of income poverty
- CONEVAL
66.5
1992

69.3

1994

80.7

1996

75.9

1998

69.2

2000

64.3

2002

57.4

2004

61.8

2005

54.1

2006

60.3 60.8

2008

2010

Figure 15. Significant models: Mexican percent personal heritage-evolution of income
poverty-CONEVAL.

PRW: Mexican Percent Homes /Food
Evolution of income poverty CONEVAL
PRW: Mexican Percent Homes /Food Evolution of income poverty CONEVAL
28.0 30.1 44.1 43.5 34.1 27.8 22.9 26.1 19.1 25.8 23.9
1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2005 2006 2008 2010

Figure 16. Significant models: Mexican percent homes-food evolution of income
poverty-CONEVAL.

Figure 17. Significant models: Mexican percent homes-capacity evolution of income
poverty-CONEVAL.
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PRW: Mexican Percent Homes
/Heritage Evolution of income
poverty - CONEVAL
PRW: Mexican Percent Homes /Heritage Evolution of income poverty CONEVAL
58.2 61.1 73.1 69.6 60.7 56.0 49.3 53.9 46.7 53.1 54.2
1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2005 2006 2008 2010

Figure 18. Significant models: Mexican percent homes-heritage evolution of income
poverty-CONEVAL.

PRW: Mexican Percent Rural
Headcount FGT(0)…
Rural Headcount FGT(0) USD 2.5 a Day Poverty Line - Average 38.5 %

35.5

39.4

40.6

59.2

55.0

47.1

39.3

32.5

30.3 24.9 30.2 27.8
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Figure 19. Mexican rural poverty trends of less significant models; Mexican percent
rural headcount FGT(0) USD $2.50 per day poverty line percent of rural populationSEDLAC.

PRW: Percent Mexican Rural Poverty
Gap FGT(1) USD 2.5 a Day Poverty…
Percent Mexican Rural Poverty Gap FGT(1) USD 2.5 a Day Poverty Line
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Figure 20. Mexican rural poverty trends of less significant models; percent
Mexican rural poverty gap FGT(1), USD $2.50 per day poverty line-SEDLAC.
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PRW: Mexican Percent Poverty and
Inequality FGT (2) USD 2.5 a Day…
Mexican Percent Poverty and Inequality FGT (2) USD 2.5 a Day Poverty
Line
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Figure 21. Mexican rural poverty trends of less significant models; Mexican percent
poverty and inequality FGT(2), USD $2.50 per day poverty line-SEDLAC.

PRW: Mexico Percent Rural Head count
FGT(0) USD 4 a Day Poverty Line - SEDLAC
Mexico Percent Rural Head count FGT(0) USD 4 a Day Poverty Line
Linear (Mexico Percent Rural Head count FGT(0) USD 4 a Day Poverty
Line)
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Figure 22. Mexican rural poverty trends of less significant models; Mexican
percent rural head count FGT(0), USD $4.00 per day poverty line-SEDLAC.

PRW: Mexican Percent Poverty Gap
FGT(1) USD 4 a Day Poverty Line SEDLAC
Mexican Percent Poverty Gap FGT(1) USD 4 a Day Poverty Line
Linear (Mexican Percent Poverty Gap FGT(1) USD 4 a Day Poverty Line)
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Figure 23. Mexican rural poverty trends of less significant models; Mexican percent
poverty gap FGT(1), USD $4.00 per day poverty line-SEDLAC.
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PRW: Mexican Percent Poverty and
Inequality FGT (2) USD 4 a Day…
Mexican Percent Poverty and Inequality FGT (2) USD 4 a Day Poverty
Line
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Figure 24. Mexican rural poverty trends of less significant models; Mexican percent
poverty and inequality FGT (2), USD $4.00 per day poverty line-SEDLAC.

PRW: Mexican Percent Rural Head
count FGT(0) Poverty Lines: 50%…
Mexican Percent Rural Head count FGT(0) Poverty Lines: 50% Median
household per capita income
32.6

44.1

45.7

45.4

51.1

51.2

45.6

40.4

39.8

37.5

40.9 35.7

1989 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2005 2006 2008 2010

Figure 25. Mexican rural poverty trends of less significant models; Mexican percent
rural head count FGT (0), poverty lines: 50 percent median household per capita incomeSEDLAC.

PRW: Mexican Percent Poverty Gap
FGT(1) Poverty Lines: 50% Median…
Mexican Percent Poverty Gap FGT(1) Poverty Lines: 50% Median
household per capita income
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Figure 26. Mexican rural poverty trends of less significant models; Mexican percent
poverty gap FGT (1), poverty lines: 50 percent median household per capita incomeSEDLAC.
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PRW: Mexican Percent Poverty and
Inequality FGT (2) Poverty Lines: 50%
Median household per capita income…
PRW: Mexican Percent Poverty and Inequality FGT (2) Poverty Lines:
50% Median household per capita income - SEDLAC
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Figure 27. Mexican rural poverty trends of less significant models; Mexican percent
poverty and inequality FGT (2), poverty lines: 50 percent median household per capita
income-SEDLAC.
These findings are consistent with what Szekely (2005, 923) finds about poverty
in Mexico declining between 1950 and 1984, remaining flat between 1984 and 1994,
increasing through 1996, and then decreasing. Szekely (2001, 241) also describes
changes in social policies as generations of policies with different focuses and intended
outcomes. The changes in macroeconomic conditions for Mexico such as the 1994-96
peso crisis and what Esquivel (2010, 4) describes as Mexican changes in the delivery of
social protection may have a more significant impact on the personal welfare of the
Mexican rural poor than corn imports from the United States or the composite amounts of
Mexican government agricultural subsidies for producers (PSE) and consumers (CSE).
Conclusions
This research looks inside the Mexican economy to evaluate the Mexican rural
welfare at a national, composite level. The findings of this study indicate despite these
overall trends, Mexican General Services Support Estimate (GSSE) possesses a
significant and measurable inverse relationship to rural Mexican poverty measured at
most levels. Other potentially causal variables are not shown to affect the measured rural
Mexican poverty levels. Mexican producer and consumer agricultural subsidies and
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Mexican corn imports do not show a causal link to rural Mexican poverty. The balance of
available data does not conclude that as imports of corn from the United States
(unbalanced trade) increase that any segment of the rural Mexican population is worse
off.
This study also underscores the need for more time-series data to advise public
policy. Researchers such as Szekely (2005) in an effort to assess poverty have sought
variations in data, but the need for additional, consistently surveyed, reliable time-series
data will in all likelihood only be met with time and consistent commitment to population
surveys. Time series data is essential to understanding historical trends and, as Hernandez
and Szekely (2009) note, limited annual data restricts viable explanation of Mexican rural
poverty. More data over longer timeframes will contribute to stronger models and
increase our understanding of fundamental causes of Mexican rural poverty. Until then,
alternate approaches to discern causality must be used. Szekely’s (2005) approach to drill
deeper within existing variables and Foster et al. (1984) FGT measures of poverty to subdivide variables available and will allow some measure of consistency of observations to
assess the personal welfare of the rural Mexican poor.
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CHAPTER IV
RURAL MEXICAN RESPONSES TO LOST AGRICULTURAL EMPLOYMENT:
MIGRATION AND OTHER SURVIVAL MECHANISMS
Introduction
As Allee et al. (1949, 539) point out, “an organism has but three choices available
when exposed to adversity: it may die, adjust, or migrate. Hibernation and aestivation are
broad adjustments to adverse weather or climate. Migration is another way to avoid
unfavorable conditions.” From the earliest formal research of human migration,
Ravenstein (1885) demonstrates the importance of financial incentives of migration
among people groups. This chapter posits that rural Mexican population responds to lost
employment opportunities by emigrating to locations of opportunity such as large
Mexican cities and to the United States.
Review of the Literature
Theoretical Background
Allee et al. (1949) point out that
migration . . . has become divided into at least three categories: . . . a more or less
continuous and direct movement . . . from one locality to another, in which there
is a periodic return to the original locality; . . . a movement of a portion of a
species population, often over great distances, to another locality, without a return
to the original area; and . . . remigration, a movement of a portion of a species
population from one locality to another, with a return movement to the original
locality. (529)
As Allee et al. (1949) note it is not just poor survival environment, but
comparatively less desirable environments that incentivize beings to migrate. “In Mexico,
the rural wage increased from 28 percent of the urban wage in 1992 to 40 percent in
2002” (World Bank 2007, 216). Papademetriou (2008) notes the implementation of
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NAFTA led to a movement of labor that neither Mexico nor the United States was
prepared to address. Kuznets (1955, 8) in a theoretical review of income inequality builds
on the premise that urban industrial sectors have higher per capita productivity than
agriculture and subsequently higher incomes. He posits that rural emigration occurs
among lower-income levels (Kuznets 1955, 9) and that the dynamic of the hope of
personal and family improvement is a significant economic incentive for personal change
(Kuznets 1955, 10, 24). Theoretically the earnings inequality between agriculture and
urban sectors widens over time (Kuznets 1955, 12-18). The process of economic growth
has “shattering effects” on an existing economic infrastructure, first widening inequality,
then narrowing it (Kuznets 1955, 18). During the phase of widening income inequality a
minimal middle class exists (Kuznets 1955, 20-21), and so pathways to personal-familial
economic improvement are limited. Kuznets warns against prescribing growth paths of
developed countries with “completely free markets, lack of penalties implicit in
progressive taxation, and the like are indispensable for . . . economic growth” to
developing countries (Kuznets 1955, 26). Kuznets concludes his discussion of income
inequality with the caution that distribution is a focal point of a functioning economic
system and that populations are aware of that distribution, noting that societies are
acutely aware and are interested in that distribution (Kuznets 1955, 27). The United
States Commission for the Study of International Migration and Cooperative Economic
Development (USCSIMCED) report to the United States Congress (1990) noted that the
main motivation for Mexican migration to the United States is economic. Black,
Kolesnikova, and Taylor remind us that, although theorists “in labor supply studies [tend]
to ignore prices other than wages,” prices of relevant consumption goods must be
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included with wages in evaluating labor supply decisions (2009, 613). Hanson (2003, 15)
documents the scope of Mexican rural-to-urban migration. Population in cities with more
than 500,000 inhabitants rose by four to five percent, and towns with less than 2,500 fell
by three to four percent between 1990 and 2000. Bhagwati (2004, 55) posits that an
economy can grow and paradoxically “immiserize” a country and its poor, unless
developmental policies are concurrently implemented. Bhagwati uses the term
“immiserize” to describe how an economy and the welfare of a people can become worse
off even though it has “grown through accumulating capital or improving productivity”
Bhagwati (2004, 55). Public policies and growth paths can affect the poor differently and
so must address the unintended effects of growth policies (Bhagwati 2004, 56).
History and Pressures to Migrate
Mexican migration to the United States dates from the mid-nineteenth century,
driven by the economic growth and territorial expansion of the United States (DelgadoWise and Covarrubias 2007, 664). The United States’ Bracero Program (1942-1964)
coordinated Mexican guest workers, especially from rural central western Mexico
(Fussell 2004, 938).
Delgado-Wise and Covarrubias (2007) note that the integration of the Mexican
economy with the United States results in significant Mexican emigration and resultant
asymmetries between the two countries in “employment insecurity, poverty, and social
marginalization” (2007, 656). They contend that the classical migration model of Harris
and Todaro (1970) does not consider the costs of migration, risk assessment, relative
deprivation, or the role of social capital in decisions to migrate.
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Motivations to migrate vary. They are enhanced by financial market failures in
the migrant’s home country. Less skilled workers tend to rely on rural-based social
networks for migration assistance, while those with greater human capital tend to use
them less and some even enter the United States in search of “adventure” (Fussell 2004,
940). Familial decisions in Mexico to financially support emigration are often made as
investments with expectations to receive return through remittances. Reynoso, Villarreal,
and Gomez (2009) note that certain sending family sizes, wealth, expectations and needs
tend to positively affect these remittances and include home ownership and even family
ownership of a truck. Reynoso et al. (2009) also note that those with greater preparation,
skill and educational attainment, tend to migrate to areas of increased opportunity, and
there is an inverse relationship between the migrant’s education and funds remitted to the
family. Both Stecklov, Winters, Stampini, and Davis (2005) and Hanson (2006) note that
increases in educational attainment are associated with increased migration, but less so
among college graduates. Hanson (2006) also notes that though increased education is
associated with migration to the United States, the inverse is true for work related skills.
Less skilled Mexicans tend to migrate to the United States at a higher rate than those with
more developed skills. The geographic origin of emigration is changing from western
Mexico to the interior urban communities (Fussell 2004, 962).
Delgado-Wise and Covarrubias (2007) conclude that migration is a complex
process and effective government policy must involve developing different ways to
integrate regionally, reducing asymmetries and promoting alternative Mexican
development models. Fitzgerald (2006) sees Mexican emigration restrictions
implemented in a bureaucratic division of multiple conflicting governing bodies in
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Mexico. Incentives to migrate are so strong that families arrange for long separations
(Frank and Wildsmith 2005, 920). Krissman (2005) maintains that migration networks
seldom originate individual hometowns, that migration from individual locales is not selfperpetuating, but that labor recruiting creates and perpetuates migratory flows. Mishra
(2007) empirically investigates the demand for labor as emigration occurs from Mexico
and finds a strong and positive impact of the outflow of workers on wages in Mexico.
Mishra finds that as emigration occurs, the more educated who remain benefit
substantially more than the less educated from the increased labor demand in Mexico that
results from the decreased domestic labor supply in the sending country.
A long term, culturally based emigration structure has developed in Mexico.
Boehm (2008, 780) finds that migration decisions almost always center on children, and
that “the multiple migration decisions parents face . . . are directly linked to the wellbeing of family members, particularly the youngest.” “The words ‘for my children’ have
become a trope linking migration to the next generation” (Boehm 2008, 786). VanWey
(2005) finds that land ownership affects migration rates as a store of wealth, a source of
employment, an investment, and as a device of ownership, and that subsequent migration
responses vary.
Migration Experience
Sana (2008, 995) attributes migrant remittances to the growth in the migration
rate referring to it as the “migration effect.” Sana also correlates migration and
subsequent remittance rates to the economic growth of the receiving country. Novoa and
Sanabria (2008) find that migrants view national borders as a transnational area, and not
as a thin line dividing one country from another. Migrant flows respond to expansion of
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emerging markets and shrink as employment demand lessens. Cassarino (2004, 275)
concludes that migrant return is “influenced by the initial motivations for migration” and
conditions and duration of stay. Whether one holds to neo-classical international
migration theory, as in Todaro (1969, 140), that migration choice is permanent or to the
new economic labor migration theory, as articulated by Cassarino (2004), that return
from a migratory experience is part of the initial migration strategy, the influences of
initial choices of the migrant to relocate are significant.
Theoretical Framework
Kuznets’ (1955, 1971) theory of economic growth and income inequality explains
the dynamic shown in this study that lower personal welfare provides incentives for the
rural Mexican population to emigrate to locations of opportunity, specifically to the
United States to seek work and higher wages. Hanson (2003) shows the changing
population demographics of smaller Mexican towns and larger cities. Allee et al. (1949)
and Ravenstein (1885) indicate that there are often common forces that induce migration,
but for Mexico there is a disproportionately higher percentage of emigration of rural
residents migrating to the United States than those from urban or suburban Mexico.
Papademetriou (2008) and Ravenstein (1885) note economic incentives as important
motivators to migrate. Bhagwati (2004) and Todaro (1969) note that internal economic
policies often result in lower personal welfare, which adds to economic incentives to
emigrate. VanWey (2005) outlines forms of wealth other than wages that contribute to or
inhibit emigration. Mathews (2007) notes that common cultural values impact the
selection of destinations within a receiving country. Aguilera-Guzman et al. (2004)
demonstrate the effect of these common cultural values in destinations in the United

96

States. Fussell (2004) and Krissman (2005) address the importance of receiving countries
enforced immigration policies on decisions to migrate. Fitzgerald (2006) provides a
complementary perspective from the sending country policies that contribute to strength
of the receiving country’s immigration policies. Delgado-Wise and Covarrubias (2007),
Black, Kolesnikova, and Taylor (2009), and Novoa and Sanabria (2008) outline
immigrant concerns as they enter a new country, and Aguilera-Guzman et al. (2004) , and
Frank and Wildsmith (2005) specifically address uncertainties in immigration that
underscore those concerns.
Methodogy
The propensity to migrate to locations of opportunity, especially to large urban
centers in Mexico and to the United States is affected by several variables. To determine
the strength and likelihood, a regression model is developed on these variables evaluated
from the 1980 to present. Hernandez and Szekely (2009, 36) note that lack of data
“impede the use of solid statistical techniques to determine the significance of the
underlying relationships.” This is especially true for national Mexican rural poverty data,
which for the most part is limited to 1984, 1989, and to more thorough surveys conducted
biannually from 1992 to the present. Hernandez and Szekely (2009, 37) address the
necessity to “obtain the longest possible time-series data on macroeconomic performance
and on poverty levels,” but time-series detail is less available for Mexico. This analysis
regresses net Mexican migration on the independent variables of personal rural welfare in
Mexico, defined as personal wealth and employment, financial opportunity in the United
States, the strength of common cultures in destination locations that may include the
existence of common religious populations and personal, culturally-based relationships,
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favorable receiving country policies, and ease of relocation including out of pocket costs
and uncertainty. This is shown as:
Y = B0 + B1x1 + … Bnxtn + Ut
Such that, M = f (PRW, FO, CV, GP, RE), where M is the net migration of Mexican
citizens to the United States, and PRW are measures of the personal rural welfare in
Mexico. FO is the financial opportunity in the United States measured in the median
income of Hispanics in the United States. CV is composite cultural values and is
measured as a proxy, the average number of personal Chicano relationships of Mexican
immigrants in the United States. GP is a measure of immigrant policies in the receiving
country and is measured as a proxy, the average number of deportations experienced by
heads of household from Mexico on a first migration attempt. RE is a measure of the ease
of relocation including financial costs, and uncertainty is measured as a proxy, the
average Hispanic unemployment rate in the United States. This is a summary proxy that
approximates costs that can include the costs of coyotes, family separation, and perils
from organized crime in the transnational area.
Net migration of Mexican citizens to the United States (M) data is from the
United States Census Bureau and measures net migration between the two countries from
1980 to present. Personal rural welfare (PRW) is accounted for using eighteen separate
measures of well-being. Fifteen are from data for the years 1984, 1989, and biannually
from 1992 to 2010. Three separate measures are from 1980 to 2010. These data are
gathered from the World Bank, the Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe
or Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (CEPAL), and the SocioEconomic Database for Latin America and the Caribbean (SEDLAC). These official
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database sources are based on data gathered by the Mexican Encuesta Nacional de
Ingresos y Gastos de los Hogares or National Survey on Household Income and
Expenditures (ENIGH).
Measures of personal rural welfare include Mexican rural poverty as a percent of
the rural population, and the calculated rural/urban poverty ratio sources from the World
Bank, the Mexican rural population in poverty and extreme poverty percentages, and the
Mexican rural household in poverty and extreme poverty percentages from CEPAL. They
include measures of population and households in poverty and extreme poverty, the total
Mexican unemployment rate, the rural to total Mexican unemployment ratio, and the
rural to total Mexican ratio of unemployment. Nine Foster et al. (FGT) poverty indicators
(Foster et al. 1984) from SEDLAC provide additional rural poverty measurements. These
include Mexican rural headcount (FGT0) at USD $2.50/day and USD $4.00/day, Mexican
rural poverty gap (FGT1) at USD $2.50/day and USD $4.00/day, and poverty and
inequality measures (FGT2) at USD $2.50/day and USD $4.00/day, as well as the 50
percent median household per capita income for Mexican rural headcount (FGT0),
Mexican rural poverty gap (FGT1), and poverty and inequality (FGT2). The total rural
unemployment percentage, rural to total unemployment ratio, and the population
employed in the rural sector are derived from CEPAL-STAT database. These last three
provide data from 1980 to 2010 and so provide more robust modeling.
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Table 15
Mexican Rural Welfare Indicators
________________________________________________________________________
Source
Data
________________________________________________________________________
World DataBank

World Development Indicators (WDI) and Global Development
Finance (GDF)

WDI/GDF

Poverty Headcount Ratio at Rural Poverty Line ( percent of Rural
Population)

Calculated

Rural to Urban Poverty Ratio (Rural percent / Urban percent)

Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe;
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (CEPAL)
CEPAL

Mexican Rural Population in Poverty percent

CEPAL

Mexican Rural Population in Extreme Poverty percent

CEPAL

Mexican Rural Households in Poverty percent

CEPAL

Mexican Rural Households in Extreme Poverty percent

Calculated

Total Mexican Unemployment Rate G= [ e/(c+e) ]

CEPAL

Total Employed Work Force [c]

CEPAL

Total Unemployed Work Force [e]

Calculated

Rural/Total Unemployment Ratio H=[ f/(d+f) ]

CEPAL

Employed Rural Work Force [d]

CEPAL

Total Unemployed Rural Work Force [f]

Calculated

Mexican Population Employment Rural/total Sector (H /G)

Socio-Economic Database for Latin America and the Caribbean (SEDLAC)
Rural Headcount FGT(0)

USD 2.5 a Day Poverty Line

Poverty Gap FGT(1)

USD 2.5 a Day Poverty Line

________________________________________________________________________
100

Table 15 (continued).
________________________________________________________________________
Source
Data
________________________________________________________________________
Poverty and Inequality FGT(2)

USD 2.5 a Day Poverty Line

Rural Headcount FGT(0)

USD 4 a Day Poverty Line

Poverty Gap FGT(1)

USD 4 a Day Poverty Line

Poverty and Inequality FGT(2)

USD 4 a Day Poverty Line

Rural Headcount FGT(0)

Poverty Lines: 50 percent Median household per
capita income

Poverty Gap FGT(1)

Poverty Lines: 50 percent Median household per
capita income

Poverty and Inequality FGT(2)

Poverty Lines: 50 percent Median household per
capita income
________________________________________________________________________
Personal Rural Welfare Data (PRW) for these rural Mexican poverty measures is
shown in the following tables. World Bank data and CEPAL data are shown in Table 16,
containing personal rural welfare indicators PRW01 – PRW06, CEPAL and SEDLAC
data are shown in Table 17, PRW07 – PRW12; and SEDLAC data are shown in Table
18, PRW13 – PRW18.
Table 16
World Bank and CEPAL Mexican Rural Welfare Data: PRW01 – PRW06
________________________________________________________________________
Year
PRW01 PRW02
PRW03 PRW04 PRW05
PRW06
________________________________________________________________________
1980
1981
________________________________________________________________________
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Table 16 (continued).
________________________________________________________________________
Year
PRW01 PRW02
PRW03 PRW04 PRW05
PRW06
________________________________________________________________________
1982
1983
1984

53.5

25.4

45.0

19.7

56.7

27.9

48.3

22.4

1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992

66.5

1.50

54.9

25.7

46.4

19.9

69.3

1.68

56.5

27.5

46.5

20.4

80.7

1.31

62.8

33.0

53.4

25.0

75.9

1.36

58.5

31.1

49.3

23.5

1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
69.2
1.58
54.7
28.5
60.7
34.1
________________________________________________________________________
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Table 16 (continued).
________________________________________________________________________
Year
PRW01 PRW02
PRW03 PRW04 PRW05
PRW06
________________________________________________________________________
2001
2002

64.3

1.56

51.2

21.9

56.0

27.8

2004

57.4

1.40

44.1

19.3

49.3

22.9

2005

61.8

1.61

47.5

21.7

53.9

26.1

2006

54.7

1.52

40.1

16.1

47.2

19.5

60.8

1.50

44.6

19.8

53.6

26.3

60.8

1.34

42.9

21.3

2003

2007
2008
2009
2010

2011
________________________________________________________________________
Table 17
CEPAL and SEDLAC Mexican Rural Welfare Data: PRW06 – PRW12
________________________________________________________________________
Year
PRW07 PRW08
PRW09 PRW10 PRW11
PRW12
________________________________________________________________________
1980

7.8%

19.5%

2.51

1981

8.5%

20.0%

2.35

1982

9.2%

20.4%

2.21

1983
9.9%
20.8%
2.10
________________________________________________________________________
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Table 17 (continued).
________________________________________________________________________
Year
PRW07 PRW08
PRW09 PRW10 PRW11
PRW12
________________________________________________________________________
1984

10.6%

21.2%

2.00

1985

11.3%

21.6%

1.92

1986

11.8%

21.7%

1.84

1987

12.3%

21.9%

1.78

1988

12.9%

22.1%

1.71

1989

13.4%

22.2%

1.66

1990

...

...

...

1991

...

...

...

1992

...

...

...

1993

2.4%

0.3%

0.13

1994

...

...

...

1995

4.7%

0.9%

0.20

1996

3.7%

0.6%

0.15

1997

2.6%

0.5%

0.20

1998

2.3%

0.3%

0.13

1999

1.7%

0.3%

0.19

2000

1.6%

0.3%

0.20

2001

1.7%

0.3%

0.18

2002

5.2%

0.3%

0.06

35.5

14.8

8.7

39.4

15.2

7.9

40.6

16.0

8.6

59.2

28.3

17.7

55.0

24.9

14.6

47.1

20.1

11.5

39.3

15.6

8.4

2003
5.5%
0.3%
0.06
________________________________________________________________________
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Table 17 (continued).
________________________________________________________________________
Year
PRW07 PRW08
PRW09 PRW10 PRW11
PRW12
________________________________________________________________________
2004

6.5%

0.3%

0.05

32.5

13.8

7.7

2005

4.5%

0.4%

0.08

30.3

12.1

6.7

2006

3.6%

0.4%

0.11

24.9

8.7

4.4

2007

3.7%

0.4%

0.10

2008

4.0%

0.4%

0.10

30.2

11.4

6.1

2009

5.5%

0.4%

0.07

2010

7.9%

0.4%

0.05

27.8

10.9

5.9

2011
________________________________________________________________________
Table 18
SEDLAC Mexican Rural Welfare Data: PRW13 – PRW18
________________________________________________________________________
Year
PRW13 PRW14
PRW15 PRW16 PRW17
PRW18
________________________________________________________________________
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
________________________________________________________________________
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Table 18 (continued).
________________________________________________________________________
Year
PRW13 PRW14
PRW15 PRW16 PRW17
PRW18
________________________________________________________________________
1989

59.4

27.4

16.6

32.6

13.3

7.9

62.0

29.0

17.0

44.1

17.3

9.1

64.9

30.0

17.8

45.7

18.7

10.2

78.8

44.0

29.6

45.4

20.6

12.5

73.9

40.1

26.1

51.1

22.7

13.1

69.6

34.8

21.8

51.2

22.3

12.9

63.1

29.1

17.3

45.6

18.7

10.3

2004

54.2

25.1

15.2

40.4

17.5

10.1

2005

51.8

23.1

13.6

39.8

16.5

9.4

2006

46.6

19.1

10.4

37.5

14.1

7.4

1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003

2007
2008
51.8
22.6
13.0
40.9
16.9
9.4
________________________________________________________________________
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Table 18 (continued).
________________________________________________________________________
Year
PRW13 PRW14
PRW15 PRW16 PRW17
PRW18
________________________________________________________________________
2009
2010

47.9

21.0

12.3

35.7

15.0

8.4

2011
________________________________________________________________________
Non-poverty variables are measured in each model. Financial opportunity (FO) is
measured as the median income (in constant 2009 dollars) of Hispanics in the United
States. This data is drawn from the United States Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor
Statistics. Strength of common cultures (CV) is measured as the average number of
personal Chicano relationships of Mexican immigrants in the United States, drawn from
the Office of Population Research at Princeton University (OPR). The summary of
government policy of the receiving country (GP) uses as a proxy, the number of
deportations during the first crossing from Mexico to the United States of heads of
households, and is drawn from the Office of Population Research at Princeton University
(OPR). The Office of Population Research collects information on multiple crossings of
individuals entering the United States from Mexico, demonstrating a pattern of return
migration. Since the first crossing is assumed to be seminal for an individual in a dual
country residency, the first crossing is considered the most important. The average
Hispanic unemployment rate in the United States is used as a proxy for ease of relocation
(RE) and is drawn from the United States Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor
Statistics. The criteria for these data selections are based on the availability of data over
the years assessed, uniqueness of the data that is avoiding multicollinearity, and
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relatedness of the data to rural Mexico. This study includes the dependent variable, net
migration from Mexico (M), as well as the non-poverty independent variables personal
relationships (CV), average head-of-household deportation rate at first border crossing
into the United States (GP), and the unemployment rate of Hispanic immigrants in the
United States. Data are summarized in Table 19.
Table 19
Regression Data of Migration Rates and Non-poverty Measures
________________________________________________________________________
Year

Net Migration
Personal Hispanic Avg HofH
Immigrant
from Mexico
Relationships
Deportations
Unemployment
to the U.S.
in the U.S.
First Crossing in the U.S.
________________________________________________________________________
1980

-245,000

0.457

0.40

10.1

1981

-228,000

0.442

0.89

10.4

1982

-156,000

0.349

0.79

13.8

1983

-159,000

0.343

0.69

13.7

1984

-218,000

0.452

0.89

10.7

1985

-262,000

0.399

0.84

10.6

1986

-268,000

0.403

0.57

10.6

1987

-275,000

0.431

0.33

8.8

1988

-332,000

0.469

0.40

8.1

1989

-432,000

0.409

0.32

8

1990

-408,000

0.451

0.22

8.2

1991

-374,000

0.467

0.51

10

1992
-309,000
0.352
0.32
11.6
________________________________________________________________________
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Table 19 (continued).
________________________________________________________________________
Year

Net Migration
Personal Hispanic Avg HofH
Immigrant
from Mexico
Relationships
Deportations
Unemployment
to the U.S.
in the U.S.
First Crossing in the US
________________________________________________________________________
1993

-341,000

0.369

0.40

10.7

1994

-396,000

0.458

0.38

9.9

1995

-415,000

0.349

0.44

9.3

1996

-415,000

0.272

0.46

8.9

1997

-415,000

0.225

0.44

7.7

1998

-508,000

0.209

0.60

7.2

1999

-651,000

0.225

0.30

6.5

2000

-424,000

0.234

0.63

5.7

2001

-590,000

0.282

0.24

6.6

2002

-564,000

0.287

0.24

7.6

2003

-537,000

0.217

0.64

7.7

2004

-511,000

0.284

0.78

7.0

2005

-485,000

0.383

0.35

6.0

2006

-464,000

0.512

0.60

5.2

2007

-443,000

0.227

0.60

5.7

2008

-422,000

0.375

0.60

7.7

2009

-401,000

0.120

-

12.1

2010

-380,000

0.333

-

12.5

2011
-368,000
11.5
________________________________________________________________________
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The research question is whether changes in personal rural welfare, financial
opportunity in the United States, the draw of cultural value sharing in the receiving
country, the general policy and effectiveness of the receiving country’s migration law, or
cost of relocation affect net Mexican migration. The breadth of this question begins to
unwrap whether and to what extent decreased welfare and lost employment in rural
Mexico, of which agriculture is a significant portion, results in measurable emigration of
the rural Mexican population to locations of economic opportunity especially to the
United States.
Ho: Lost rural welfare in Mexico does not cause measurable increases in net
Mexican migration to the United States.
H1: Lost rural welfare in Mexico results in measurable increases in net Mexican
migration to the United States.
Has financial opportunity specifically in United States affected net Mexican
migration?
Ho: Financial opportunity in the United States does not cause measurable
increases in net Mexican migration to the United States.
H1: Financial opportunity in the United States results in measurable increases in
net Mexican migration to the United States.
Does cultural value sharing available to Mexican immigrants in the United States,
as seen in the number of Hispanic relationships of immigrants, positively affect net
migration?
Ho: Shared cultural values in relationships available to Mexican immigrants in
the United States do not result in measurable increases in net Mexican migration to the
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United States.
H1: Shared cultural values in relationships available to Mexican immigrants in
the United States result in measurable increases in net Mexican migration to the United
States.
Have increases in United States restrictive immigration policies reduced net rural
Mexican migration?
Ho: Increases in United States restrictive immigration policies do not result in
decreased net rural Mexican migration to the United States.
H1: Increases in United States restrictive immigration policies result in decreased
net rural Mexican migration to the United States.
Have increased costs of relocation to United States negatively affected net rural
Mexican migration?
Ho: Increased costs of relocation to United States do not result in measurable
decrease net Mexican migration to the United States.
H1: Increased costs of relocation to United States result in measurable decreased
rural Mexican migration to the United States.
Findings
Eighteen regression models are evaluated to measure effect on net Mexican
migration of measures of rural Mexican poverty, financial opportunity in the United
States, common values in the form of culturally based relationships found by Mexicans in
the United States, migration policy-driven activities of the United States government, and
of measures of ease of relocation in the United States.
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The regression analysis model using Mexican rural poverty percentage of the
rural population from the World Bank provides low adjusted R-square scores and model
significance and is, thus ignored. This is also true of the model using the calculated
rural/urban poverty ratio from the World Bank and the nine models using the Foster,
Greer, Thorbecke (FGT) poverty indicator regressions using data provided by SEDLAC
and so all are dismissed from consideration.
Table 20
Regression Summary by Mexican Rural Welfare Indicators
________________________________________________________________________
Source -------------------------------- Model -----------------------------------

------------------------- Variables ----------------------

R Square
Adj R Square Obs. Sig. F
IV Coef
p-value
1-tail
________________________________________________________________________
World DataBank, World Development Indicators
WDI/GDF
0.5507

Poverty Headcount Ratio at Rural Poverty Line
0.0109
10
0.5221
none

Calculated
0.5302

Rural to Urban Poverty Ratio (Rural percent / Urban percent)
0.0570
10
0.5549
none

Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe;
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (CEPAL)
Percent Mexican Rural Population in Poverty
0.7504
0.5425
12
0.074
CV
GP
RE

456,897
187,880
33,370

0.2050
0.1530
0.1370

0.1025
0.0765
0.0685

Percent Mexican rural Population in Extreme Poverty
0.7704
0.5791
12
0.0599
CV
512,809
0.1260 0.0630
GP
181,058
0.1110 0.0555
RE
36,725
0.1010 0.0505
________________________________________________________________________
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Table 20 (continued).
________________________________________________________________________
Source -------------------------------- Model -----------------------------------

------------------------- Variables ----------------------

R Square
Adj R Square Obs. Sig. F
IV Coef
p-value
1-tail
________________________________________________________________________
Percent Mexican Rural Households in Poverty
0.8287
0.6859
12
0.0269
PRW
CV
GP
RE

10,197
580,899
208,308
36,583

0.1220 0.0610
0.0410 0.0205
0.0500 0.0250
0.0530 0.0265

Percent Mexican Rural Households in Extreme Poverty
0.8493
0.7237
12
0.0188
PRW
CV
GP
RE

11,980
618,370
200,754
38,844

0.0780 0.0390
0.0270 0.0135
0.0410 0.0205
0.0360 0.0180

Calculated
0.8478

Calculated
0.8538

Total Mexican Unemployment Rate G= [ e/(c+e) ]
0.8098
26
0.0000
FO
(3.77450)
CV
469,828
GP
155,365
RE
24,841

0.1340 0.0670
0.0090 0.0045
0.0250 0.0125
0.0080 0.0040

Rural to Total Unemployment Ratio H=[ f/(d+f) ]
0.8173
26
0.0000
CV
397,173
GP
140,635
RE
24,435

0.0250 0.0125
0.0400 0.0200
0.0070 0.0035

Calculated
0.8581

Mexican Rural to Total Employment Ratio (H /G)
0.8226
26
0.0000
CV
369,750
0.0340 0.0170
GP
126,400
0.0690 0.0345
RE
24,183
0.0070 0.0035
________________________________________________________________________
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Table 20 (continued).
________________________________________________________________________
Source -------------------------------- Model -----------------------------------

----------------------- Variables ----------------------

R Square
Adj R Square Obs. Sig. F
IV Coef
p-value
1-tail
________________________________________________________________________
Socio-Economic Database for Latin America and the Caribbean (SEDLAC)
Rural Headcount FGT(0) - USD 2.5 a Day Poverty Line
0.5301
0.0602
11
0.4490 none
Poverty Gap FGT(1) - USD 2.5 a Day Poverty Line
0.5243
0.0487
11
0.4587

none

Poverty and Inequality FGT (2) - USD 2.5 a Day Poverty Line
0.5241
0.0482
11
0.4591 none
Rural Headcount FGT(0) - USD 4 a Day Poverty Line
0.5287
0.0574
11
0.4513 none
Poverty Gap FGT(1) - USD 4 a Day Poverty Line
0.5289
0.0577
11
0.4511

none

Poverty and Inequality FGT (2) - USD 4 a Day Poverty Line
0.5269
0.0537
11
0.4545 none
Rural Headcount FGT(0) - Poverty Lines: 50 percent Median household per capita
income
0.5321
0.0641
11
0.4457 none
Poverty Gap FGT(1) - Poverty Lines: 50 percent Median household per capita income
0.5310
0.0620
11
0.4475 none
Poverty and Inequality FGT (2) - Poverty Lines: 50 percent Median household per capita
income
0.5355 0.0709
11
0.4399 none
________________________________________________________________________
Seven regression models provided acceptable adjusted R-square results and model
significance. These reflect personal rural welfare in Mexico measuring poverty and
unemployment from the Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe or
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (CEPAL). In each model
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increases in the number of Hispanic relationships in the United States, a proxy of
common value sharing (CV); increases in the number of deportations of head-ofhousehold on first migration attempt, a proxy for active enforcement of government
migration policy (GP); and increases in Hispanic unemployment in the United States, a
proxy for all of the costs of relocation (RE), result in reduced migration.
Of these seven, four directly reported measures of personal rural welfare from
CEPAL possess minimal data points needed for a robust regression model and
demonstrate Durbin-Watson tests that show positive serial correlation of the predictor
variables. There is, therefore, no useable evidence that the independent variables of those
four models predict migration from Mexico to the United States. These are percent
Mexican rural population in poverty, percent Mexican rural population in extreme
poverty, percent Mexican rural households in poverty, and percent rural households in
extreme poverty. Three models, however, possess an acceptable number of data points,
26, and are not shown by the Durbin-Watson test to exhibit positive serial correlation of
predictor variables. These are total Mexican unemployment rate, Mexican rural to total
unemployment ratio, and Mexican rural to total employment ratio.
Table 21
Durbin-Watson Statistic Values
________________________________________________________________________
Model, IV
k n
D
DW table used p-value
DL
DU
________________________________________________________________________
Percent Mexican Rural Population in Poverty
CV
6
12 0.1878743
5%
.0125
.268
2.832
GP
6
12 0.1878743
5%
.0765
.268
2.832
RE
6
12 0.1878743
5%
.0685
.268
2.832
D is below dL. There is evidence of positive autocorrelation among residuals.
________________________________________________________________________
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Table 21 (continued).
________________________________________________________________________
Model, IV
k n
D
DW table used p-value
DL
DU
________________________________________________________________________
Percent Mexican Rural Population in Extreme Poverty
CV
6
12 0.1878743
5%
.0630
.268
2.832
GP
6
12 0.1878743
5%
.0555
.268
2.832
RE
6
12 0.1878743
5%
.0505
.268
2.832
D is below dL. There is evidence of positive autocorrelation among residuals.
Percent Mexican Rural Households in Poverty
PRW
6
12 0.1878743
5%
.0610
.268
2.832
CV
6
12 0.1878743
5%
.0205
.268
2.832
GP
6
12 0.1878743
5%
.0250
.268
2.832
RE
6
12 0.1878743
5%
.0565
.268
2.832
D is below dL. There is evidence of positive autocorrelation among residuals.
Percent Mexican Rural Households in Extreme Poverty
PRW
6
12 0.1878743
5%
.0390
.268
2.832
CV
6
12 0.1878743
5%
.0135
.268
2.832
GP
6
12 0.1878743
5%
.0205
.268
2.832
RE
6
12 0.1878743
5%
.0180
.268
2.832
D is below dL. There is evidence of positive autocorrelation among residuals.
Total Mexican Unemployment Rate
FO
6
26 2.151977
5%
.0670
.897
1.992
CV
6
26 2.151977
1%
.0045
.711
1.759
GP
6
26 2.151977
5%
.0125
.897
1.992
RE
6
26 2.151977
1%
.0040
.711
1.759
D is below dL. There is no evidence of positive autocorrelation among residuals.
Mexican Rural to Total Unemployment Ratio
CV
6
26 2.123034
5%
.0125
.897
1.992
GP
6
26 2.123034
5%
.0200
.897
1.992
RE
6
26 2.123034
1%
.0035
.711
1.759
D is below dL. There is no evidence of positive autocorrelation among residuals.
Mexican Rural to Total Employment Ratio
CV
6
26 2.121035
5%
.0170
.897
1.992
GP
6
26 2.121035
5%
.0345
.897
1.992
RE
6
26 2.121035
1%
.0035
.711
1.759
D is below dL. There is no evidence of positive autocorrelation among residuals.
________________________________________________________________________
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The net Mexican migration rate to United States averages 387,375 persons
annually from 1980 to 2011. In the three remaining models using CEPAL measures of
poverty for rural Mexican welfare, increases in the Hispanic unemployment rate in the
United States (RE) by one percent results in a 6.3 percent decrease of the annual
migration rate (24,486 persons). In these models an increase by one in the average
deportations of the head-of-household per year on first attempt at migration (GP) results
in a decrease in annual migration of 36.3 percent (140,800 persons). In these models an
increase of one in the few number of meaningful Hispanic relationships (CV) in the
United States as tracked by the Office of Population Research (OPR) results in a decrease
in the migration rate of 106 percent (412,250 persons). Financial opportunity (FO) is
statistically significant in one model that includes total Mexican unemployment rate as a
measure of personal rural welfare, but the coefficient is very small (3.8) and so is
dismissed from consideration.
The model that uses the total Mexican unemployment rate calculated from
CEPAL as a measure of rural welfare has R-Square values of .8478 and .8098 and a
model significance of .0000. The coefficient for financial opportunity in the United States
(FO) is -3.7745 with a one-tail, p-value of.0670. Although statistically valid, the small
size of the coefficient, -3.7745, means the effect is insignificant. The coefficient for
common cultural sharing (CV) is 469,828 with a one-tail, p-value of.0045. The
coefficient is 1.213 more than the average net Mexican migration rate and so an increase
of one in the average number of Hispanic relationships in the United States will result in
an annual decrease in migration of approximately 469,828 persons. The number of
deportations of head-of-household on first migration attempt (GP) in this model has a
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coefficient of 155,365 and a one-tail, p-value of.0125, meaning that as the number of
these deportations, which average .51 from 1980 to 2011, increase by one the annual
migration rate is cut by 40.1 percent. The Hispanic unemployment rate in the United
States, a measure of ease of relocation (RE) in this model, has a coefficient of 24,841 and
a one-tail, p-value of.0040, meaning that as the average Hispanic unemployment rate in
the United States, which averages 9.07 from 1980 to 2011, increases by one percent the
migration rate is reduced by 6.4 percent, or 24,841 persons.
The model that uses the rural to total Mexican unemployment ratio calculated
from CEPAL as a measure of rural welfare has R-Square values of .8538 and .8173 and a
model significance of .0000. The coefficient for common cultural sharing (CV) is
397,173 with a one-tail, p-value of .0125. The coefficient is 1.025 more than the average
net Mexican migration rate, so an increase of one in the average number of Hispanic
relationships in the United States will result in an annual decrease in migration of
approximately 397,173 persons. The number of deportations of head of household on first
migration attempt (GP) in this model has a coefficient of 140,635 and a one-tail, p-value
of.0200, meaning that as the number of these deportations, which average .51 from 1980
to 2011, increase by one the annual migration rate is cut by 36.3 percent. The Hispanic
unemployment rate in the United States, a measure of ease of relocation (RE) in this
model, has a coefficient of 24,435 and a one-tail, p-value of.0035, meaning that as the
average unemployment rate in the United States, which averages 9.07 from 1980 to 2011,
increases by one percent the migration rate is reduced by 6.3 percent, or 24,435 persons.
The model that uses the rural to total Mexican employment as a ratio calculated
from CEPAL as a measure of rural welfare has R-Square values of .8581 and .8226 and a
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model significance of .0000. The coefficient for common cultural sharing (CV) is
369,750 with a one-tail, p-value of.0170. The coefficient is 95.5 of the average net
Mexican migration rate and so an increase of one in the average number of Hispanic
relationships in the United States will result in an annual decrease in migration of
approximately 369,750 persons. The number of deportations of head of household on first
migration attempt (GP) in this model has a coefficient of 126,400 and a one-tail, p-value
of.0345, meaning that as the number of these deportations, which average .51 from 1980
to 2011, increase by one the annual migration rate is cut by 32.6 percent. The Hispanic
unemployment rate in the United States, a measure of ease of relocation (RE) in this
model, has a coefficient of 24,183 and a one-tail, p-value of.0035, meaning that as the
average unemployment rate in the United States, which averages 9.07 from 1980 to 2011,
increases by one percent the migration rate is reduced by 6.2 percent, or 24,183 persons.
Lost rural welfare in Mexico demonstrates no increases in net Mexican migration,
and in two models there is a modest decrease in migration due to lower rural welfare.
This null hypothesis is rejected. Only one of the models shows statistical significance of
the effect of financial opportunity in the United States increasing migration. This null
hypothesis is rejected, but findings possess such a small coefficient as to make
conclusions of little value. The models demonstrated a lessening of migration as the
result of increases in shared cultural values in relationships available to Mexican
immigrants in the United States. Although expected change (H1) is to increase migration,
the coefficient indicates that as cultural values increase migration decreases. This null
hypothesis is rejected. Increases in the enforcement of restrictive United States
immigration policies and increases in costs of relocation measured in increased Hispanic
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unemployment in the United States have statistical and measurable effect on decreasing
net Mexican migration to the United States. These null hypotheses are rejected.
Analysis
Analysis of eighteen models, each with separate measures of personal rural
welfare in Mexico show that only three provide viable predictions of net Mexican
migration to the United States. Four provide meaningful significance values, but are
shown to possess significant serial correlation among the predictor variables. Eleven
regression analyses provide poor fit and are ignored. These regression models include the
Mexican rural poverty headcount percentage of the rural population and the calculated
rural/urban poverty ratio from the World Bank, and the nine Foster, Greer, Thorbecke
(FGT) poverty indicator models from SEDLAC.
Three regression models show statistical significance for the independent
variables. In each of these models the percent of Hispanics unemployed in the United
States, the average number of deportations of heads of households on first border
crossing into the United States and the number of personal friends from Mexico an
immigrant has in the United States show inverse relationship to the net Mexican
migration rate. None of the regression models show significant p-values without serial
correlation for measures of personal rural welfare.
These models show that with probabilities at 95 percent that for every percent
that Hispanic unemployment in the United States increases the net Mexican migration
into the United States decreases by approximately 24,486 persons. The average net
Mexican migration rate of 387,375 from 1980 to 2011 is assumed (United States
Department of Commerce, United States Census Bureau, 2012) this is a decrease of 6.3
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percent. This conclusion is expected from migration theory presented by Kuznets (1955,
1971), Papademetriou (2008) and Ravenstein (1885). Non-diaspora migration is most
often driven by financial incentives.
These models also show with probabilities at or above 95 percent, as the average
number of deportations of heads of household on first border crossing into the United
States increases by one the net migration from Mexico into the United States decreases
by 40,800 per year or 3.3 percent. These findings are consistent with Fitzgerald (2006),
Delgado-Wise, Kolesnikova, and Taylor (2007), Novoa and Sanabria (2008), and Frank
and Wildsmith (2005) that a receiving country’s immigration policies and uncertainties of
immigration affect migrant patterns.
Surprisingly, these models also show with probabilities near or above 95 percent
that as the number of personal Chicano relationships in the United States increase by one,
net migration from Mexico into the United States decreases from, 412,250 per year or
106 percent. This is counter-intuitive to findings of Aguilera-Guzman et al. (2004) who
show the importance of common cultural values in the destination locations in the United
States. The coefficients for this causal variable are so strong as to predict a pattern of
reverse migration. This implies that, although interpersonal relationships are important to
immigrants, they provide an inverse incentive to further migration or provide an incentive
for return migration paths.
Financial opportunity is statistically significant in one model: total Mexican
unemployment rate. The causal variable, financial opportunity, is measured as the median
income of Hispanics in the United States on an annual basis. This significance could be
partially the result of crowding out by other Latinos as that population segment grows

121

and Hispanic labor niches experience adequate labor supply and driving down wages.
The coefficient is very small, so it is dismissed from consideration. The relationships
shown here may be most reflective of the impact of the independent variables on the rural
Mexican family. Although lacking strong probability, these findings indicate a tendency
for family members of the very poor to not migrate. This may be due to the need for
immediate family members to remain at home or might indicate that at these levels of
poverty physical or monetary capacity to migrate do not exist.
Conclusions
Available United States census data indicates that a large number of Mexican
immigrants self-report rural roots (Burstein 2007), but financial capital and physical
ability may be more influential in migration and these assets may be the result of
intermediate migration steps, such as migration to larger Mexican communities and then
to the United States.
It is expected that in the last two decades as the employment opportunity
decreases and poverty increases in rural Mexico there is a corresponding increase in
emigration from rural Mexico directly to locations of opportunity in the United States.
This is not the case from observed data. Financial opportunity and decreased personal
welfare confirm migration incentives, but available data does not show a link between
rural Mexican poverty and net Mexican migration to the United States. Finally, increases
in cultural relationships in the United States, United States deportation rates, and
Hispanic unemployment in the United States significantly lower net Mexican migration
rates.
More survey data of rural Mexico is needed. Although Mexican poverty data is
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available, most measures of rural poverty data in Mexico is limited, consisting of 1989
and biannual data from 1992. Secondary indicators of rural well-being are also scarce.
Consistent with Hernandez and Szekely (2009) and Székely’s (2005) recommendations,
more time-series data is needed for more robust rural poverty assessment in Mexico, and
these more robust models will confirm currently observed trends and migration
incentives.
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSIONS
The inclusion of Mexico into the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA) forming a trilateral trade bloc composed of the United States, Canada, and
Mexico on January 1, 1994 caused concern within each of the member countries. These
concerns ranged from loss of rights to fairness to questions of effectiveness of free trade.
Baghwati (2004) clearly outlines the benefits of free trade, but Stiglitz and Charlton
(2005) caution about population segments that lose as free trade is implemented.
There is concern that the heavily subsidized domestic corn production leads to
unfair trade advantages with Mexico in agriculture. The subsequent concern is that as
low cost yellow corn is sold into Mexico large portions of the Mexican agriculture sector
are displaced and experience increases in poverty. Lastly, there is concern that as income
decreases in the Mexican rural sector that population is incentivized to migrate to
locations of opportunity in larger Mexican cities and to the United States.
Research findings show from 1986 to 2007, as the United States/Mexico ratios of
fertilizer, farm equipment, and general governmental support (GSSE) of agriculture
increase, exports of corn to Mexico increase. Total production ratios, land production
efficiency ratios, personal subsidy to the individual farmer (PSE) ratios, and consumer
subsidy (CSE) ratios between the two countries do not predict increases in exports of
corn from the United States to Mexico. Research findings also show that increases in
rural poverty in Mexico are predicted by changes in the general governmental support
(GSSE) of agriculture ratio between the United States to Mexico. Increases in imported
corn from the United States, personal subsidy to the individual farmer (PSE) ratios, and
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consumer subsidy (CSE) ratios between the two countries do not predict increases in
rural poverty in Mexico. Research findings show migration from Mexico to the United
States is not affected by personal rural welfare, but is negatively affected by Hispanic
unemployment in the United States, the number of deportations of heads of household on
first immigration attempt, and the number of personal Hispanic friends in the United
States while in the country.
In summary, this research shows that a domestic corn subsidy to United States
farmers does not affect corn exports to Mexico. Increases in exports of corn to Mexico
from the United States do not predict an increase in Mexican rural poverty, and levels of
rural Mexican poverty from 1980 to 2010 are not seen to affect Mexican migration to the
United States.
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